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ABSTRACT
A THUMB ON THE SCALE:
BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND THE ESSAYS OF
STEPHEN JAY GOULD

by
Kevin F. Ryan

Biological determinism is a field of scientific theory that attributes human behavior,
relationships, and social structures predominantly to hereditary and biological rather
than cultural and environmental influences. In almost twenty-five years of published
essays, the Harvard evolutionary biologist, Stephen Jay Gould, has sounded an alarm
that biological determinism—through its scientific rationalization of slavery, eugenic
sterilization, Nazi atrocity, and more subtle forms of injustice

perennially poses a real

and dangerous threat to humanity. This thesis explores the career-long anti-hereditarian
thread permeating Gould's published works on evolutionary history and the history
of science. Gould's assertions regarding the cultural embeddedness of science are
emphasized—as well as his view that the human species' role within the "big picture"
of geological time and space is often dangerously misinterpreted. His alternative view,
biological potentialism, is presented and defended.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

[The Mismeasure of Man] is not really a serious book. It is merely a Marxist
polemic.. . . Ordinarily a book this loaded with errors is just ignored. Why not
this one? Because its author is a popular and influential writer, and this book has
had a major impact on the public. Its first edition sold 125,000 copies. It has been
lavishly praised by literary publications like the New York Review of Books. . . .
So a lot of people not only accepted it but loved it. Why? I think the reason is that
it panders to what people want to believe.
Frank Schmidt, in Personnel Psychology
Gould uses evolutionary theory to argue not for racial superiority, of course, but
for racial equality. This might seem surprising on its face. If anything, evolution
predicts differentiation. Not even in Animal Farm, and surely not in Darwin's
theory, do all animals end up equal. Gould makes fun of his predecessors for
drawing the (plausible) inference of inequality from evolution and proceeds to
draw a most implausible one himself. The hare might beat the tortoise, or the
tortoise the hare, but it would be irrational to predict a dead heat between the two.
Still, Gould treats evolution with such a proprietary air that he seems to feel he can
make it come out any way he wants including dead heats where needed.
Tom Bethel, in American Spectator

These are harsher criticisms than might ordinarily be expected about someone whose
ostensible field has been simply the study and teaching of paleontology. They are written
about Stephen Jay Gould, professor of paleozoology at Harvard University. If it were
possible to read the between the lines and distill a meta-message from these comments,
one might conclude that some element of Gould's work has struck a nerve in these critics.
That element may well have been Gould's twenty-five-year offensive against biological
determinism—the lingering and insidious misapplication of biological science as
justification for inequities in social systems.
Biological determinism is a field of scientific theory which attributes human
behavior, human relationships (both within our species and with other species), and
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persisting social structures predominantly to biological rather than cultural or
environmental influences.
The subject of this thesis is the career-long thread of anti-biological-determinist
argument in Stephen Jay Gould's published works. His topics have included the
nineteenth-century theory of polygenism (which cast races as separate species, and was
employed to rationalize slavery) and the application of mental testing to immigration
restriction, eugenic sterilization of the mentally retarded, and socioeconomic planning.
In all, his ongoing goal seems to be the inoculation of the lay audience against passive
acceptance of what can seem a powerfully intimidating force: the "scientifically proven,"
monolithically unalterable "fact of nature." Gould believes that lay people need better
information to perceive the social ramifications of biological determinism (which is also
known as hereditarianism).
In addition to academic research and teaching in geology, paleontology, and the
history of science, Gould has contributed a monthly essay, "This View of Life," to
Natural History magazine since 1974. By 1999 he had contributed over 200 essays to
this column, which he expects to discontinue in the year 2000. Gould has gained a mass
popular audience with this prolific and uninterrupted string of essays, with a series of
collections repackaging them in book form, and with original book-length works.
Although, as with his book, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (1977), he has written for
audiences of scientific peers, his authorial success has derived chiefly from popular
essay collections that include Ever Since Darwin (1977), The Panda's Thumb (1980),
The Flamingo's Smile (1985), and Bully for Brontosaurus (1991). His most celebrated
popular work and indeed his most avowedly anti-hereditarian effort, The Mismeasure of
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Man (1981), has been named one of the one hundred best non-fiction books of the
century by a Random House panel. He has won the National Book Award, The National
Book Critics Circle Award, the Phi Beta Kappa Science Award, and the MacArthur
award.
Ironically, it is Gould's very popularity that is often cited by critics attempting to
dismiss his credibility. How can a scientist / author remain faithful to the technical
nuances of his discipline, they argue, while writing for a popular audience? And yet as a
prolific essayist Gould consistently avows just such a goal

the goal of writing with

respect for the intellect of the perceptive lay person. In a secular era when credulous awe
of the mysteries of religion is frequently dismissed and supplanted by a sometimes
equally credulous deference to the mysteries of science, Gould seems to view himself as
a clarifying advocate for the informed consumption of bioscientific information. His
goal: informing a general public all too easily manipulated and enlisted by pseudotechnical obfuscation.
Stephen Jay Gould was born in 1941 in Queens, New York. His decision to
become a paleontologist occurred at the age of five on a visit with his father to New
York's American Museum of Natural History. After completing undergraduate work at
Antioch College, Gould earned his doctorate in paleontology from Columbia University
in 1967, and began his long affiliation with Harvard University that same year as an
assistant professor of geology. He became a full professor by 1973 and later the Curator
of Invertebrate Paleontology at the Harvard Museum of Comparative Zoology. An
authority on West Indian snail species, Gould was also recognized in 1972 (with collaborator Niles Eldredge) for introducing the evolutionary theory of punctuated equilibrium,

which described evolutionary history as long periods of stasis separated by sudden
intervals of major change. This contrasts with the long-held theory that evolutionary
change is slow and gradual. Among numerous career honors, Gould is the current
president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
An ardent scholar of evolutionary theory, Gould has imbued his essays with a
scientific historian's subtle sensitivity to the real-world contexts and consequences of
Darwinism and of other important biological and geological theories. He is an unabashed
celebrant of science as an important, affirming, and immensely creative human activity.
Indeed, much of Gould's appeal may stern from the multi-faceted "Renaissance Man"
ethos that permeates his essays. Gould's ability to present technical concepts interestingly to a popular audience seems to derive from deliberate attention to readers' nonscientific realms of interest. Instead of presenting science in a dryly technical "just the
facts" style, Gould establishes interest and relevance for science through allusions to
historical and political contexts, art, the literature of Mary Shelley and James Joyce,
philosophical theory, music, and baseball.
Relatedly, the cultural embeddedness of science is one of Gould's recurrent themes.
Gould rejects two common opposing views of science: 1) science as an impassive and
mechanical processor of objectively acquired facts, and 2) science as a sequence of
purely isolated "Eureka!" events entirely encompassed within the creativity of the
scientists. Instead, Gould welcomes the admission that the cultural context of science is
integral to its own identity, while cautioning about the social ramifications of this interrelatedness:
Science is no inexorable march to truth mediated by the collection of objective
information and the destruction of ancient superstition. Scientists, as ordinary
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human beings, unconsciously reflect in their theories the social and political
constraints of their times. As privileged members of society, more often than not
they end up defending existing social arrangements as biologically foreordained.
(Ever Since 15)
To him, a true scientist loses no credibility in the admission of his or her own cultural
influences. Only in the obfuscation of the relationship does Gould see danger. He sees
biology and culture as "interpenetrating opposites" best interpreted by a dialectical I
synthetic approach (Urchin 153).
Gould's dyed-in-the-wool anti-hereditarianism did not arise in a vacuum. His
arguments against biological determinism advance a torch carried by the American
journalist Walter Lippman in the second decade of this century, by the Swedish
sociologist Gunnar Myrdal in the 1940s, by the author Ashley Montagu in the 1950s,
and by contemporary allies such as Northeastern University psychologist, Leon Kamin.
In respect for his venerable antecedent, Gould praises Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 book, An
American Dilemma, for its stand against scientific racism. Gould uses the following
quote from Myrdal's book to support his own concern that many cultural biases are
buried so deeply as to be unrecognizable:
But there must be countless errors of the same sort that no living man can yet
detect, because of the fog within which our type of Western culture envelops us.
Cultural influences have set up the assumptions about the mind, the body, and the
universe with which we begin; pose the questions we ask; influence the facts we
seek; determine the interpretation we give these facts and direct our reaction to
these interpretations and conclusions. (qtd. in Urchin 216)
To Gould, the history of science is rich with (often ulterior) social implications,
implications he has explored in his essays for a quarter of a century. To this exploration
he has applied his distinguishing gifts as a writer: his breadth of knowledge, the clarity
and readability of his work, his ability to enliven the history of science through his multi-
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faceted "Renaissance Man" pedagogy, and the credibility that comes from wide
recognition of his work.
The argument between advocates of biological determinism, opposing advocates
of pure environmentalism, and outspoken moderates like Gould is often heated. It has
inflamed social and political polarization at many levels. Although often cast as an
extremist by critics, Gould supports what can be considered the hybrid theory of
"biological potentialism," which embraces both hereditary and environmental influences
in the determination of human behavior, achievement, and social structures. Theoretical
moderation notwithstanding, the argument against pure, "high-potency" hereditarianism
is an endeavor to which Stephen Jay Gould has indefatigably applied more energy than
anyone.

CHAPTER 2

FOCUSSING ON BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM
2.1

The Nature of Biological Determinism

Biological determinism is a set of theories used to explain human social and political
behaviors and institutions as the inevitable consequences of natural biological laws.
The archetypal biological determinist statement contends that one race, class, or subgroup
of humans is biologically (and, therefore, inevitably) superior to another. To Gould,
biological determinist ideas garner strong appeal among individuals occupying favored
positions within their societies. He argues that
appeals to innate biology for the explanation of human behavior have often been
advanced in the name of enlightenment. The proponents of biological determinism
argue that science can cut through the web of superstition and sentimentalism to
instruct us about our true nature. But their claims have usually had a different
primary effect. They are used by the leaders of class-stratified societies to assert
that a current social order must prevail because it is the law of nature. . . . (Ever
Since 223)
To biological determinist theorists, nature proscribes an essentially inevitable and
unalterable character to human behavior, achievement, and social status. On human
intelligence, for example, the early twentieth-century determinist, Henry Goddard, wrote:
Stated in its boldest form our thesis is that the chief determiner of human
conduct is a unitary mental process which we call intelligence: that this process is
conditioned by a nervous mechanism that is inborn: that the degree of efficiency to
be attained by that nervous mechanism and the consequent grade of intelligence or
mental level for each individual is determined by the kind of chromosomes that
come together with the union of the germ cells: that it is but little affected by any
later influence except such serious accidents as may destroy part of the mechanism.
As a consequence any attempt at social adjustment which fails to take into
account the determining character of the intelligence and its unalterable grade in
each individual is illogical and inefficient. (1)
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To Stephen Jay Gould, however, human behavior and social status—although undeniably
influenced to some extent by biology—are in significant part sociocultural constructs for
which biological determinism serves as a powerfully homeostatic rationalization.
After the publication of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859, biological
determinism as a driving social theory gained widespread support. Science-based
rationalizations for racism increased sharply. They did so largely through the deterministically rich concept of recapitulation, which propounded that "ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny." More simply put, recapitulation contended that the embryological, infantile,
and juvenile stages of human development (human ontogeny) reenact the evolutionary
stages through which the human species evolved from ancestral species. According to
the theory, contemporary human juveniles resemble ancestral primate adults. In Ontogeny and Phylogeny (1977), Gould examined for an audience of his peers the history and
hereditarian ramifications of recapitulation theory.
Writing on a more formal, scholarly level than that of the more popular works
that would follow, Gould laid the groundwork in Ontogeny and Phylogeny for antihereditarian arguments that were to recur frequently throughout his subsequent work.
These arguments emphasize culture's influence upon science, the continuing lack of
corroborating data for determinist contentions, and the ever-present a priori conclusion—
the subconscious bias or intentional "thumb-on-the-scale" prejudice that can make
science anything but objective. Gould wrote "the sway of biological determinism, the
lack of sensitivity to environmental influence, and the blatant desire to crown one's own
group as biologically superior are quite characteristic of the time
today" (Ontogeny 130).

and scarcely extinct
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One early and influential recapitulationist was the German biologist, Ernst Haeckel.
A contemporary of Darwin's and a fervent promoter of Darwinism in his own country,
Haeckel postulated that the gill-like slits in human embryos represent the gills of
ancestral adult fishes. Haeckel believed strongly in the inheritance of acquired traits
(Lamarckianism) through terminal addition, which theorized a progressive incrementing
of the number of sequential traits reenacted in the embryo-to-adult development process
as new species evolved from existing species. For humans, as more and more advanced
traits were added to the end of our evolving ancestors' hypothesized embryo-to-adult
developmental sequences, the amount of time spent by individuals reenacting the earlier
phases would necessarily "condense" to accommodate the increased number of traits.
This ensured that the ever-increasing number of developmental stages would still be
completed by the time the juvenile entered adulthood.
Gould contends that "recapitulation intruded itself into every subject that offered
even the remotest possibility of a connection between children of 'higher' races and the
persistent habits of 'adult savages' (Ontogeny 117). Mainstream scientists
group of crackpots

not a fringe

seemed eager to contribute to the recapitulation movement. Carl

Vogt, a respected German anatomist, wrote in 1864:
The grown-up Negro partakes, as regards his intellectual faculties, of the nature of
the child, the female, and the senile white. . . . Some tribes have founded states,
possessing a peculiar organization; but, as to the rest, we may boldly assert that the
whole race has, neither in the past nor the present, performed anything tending to
the progress of humanity or worthy of preservation. (qtd. in Gould, Ontogeny 130)
With statements like this one epitomizing the expressed sentiments of many mainstream
scientists after 1860, Gould asserts that evolutionary theory "quickly became the primary
weapon for many efforts in social change" (Ontogeny 120).
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Recapitulationism's race-conscious orientation was epitomized in the words of
Harvard's widely respected Swiss-born naturalist, Louis Agassiz (1807-1873), who stated
that "the brain of the Negro is that of the imperfect brain of a seven month's infant in the
womb of the White" (qtd. in Gould, Ontogeny 127). The British polymath, Herbert
Spencer (1820-1903), echoed this sentiment in 1895: "The intellectual traits of the
uncivilized are traits recurring in the children of the civilized" (qtd. in Gould, Ontogeny
128).
An example of applied recapitulationism lay in the work of Italian physician,
Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), who with his theories of "criminal anthropology"
attempted to construct a scientific method for segregating criminals and underachievers
from the general population. Lombroso's theories descended from Franz Joseph Gall's
early nineteenth-century theory of phrenology, which attributed mental attributes to
localized and palpable physiognomic skull features. In 1909, looking back at his career,
Lombroso wrote of the personal epiphany wherein, by examining one offender's skull, he
discovered the connection between atavistic physical features and criminal tendencies:
This was not merely an idea, but a revelation. At the sight of that skull, I
seemed to see all of a sudden, lighted up as a vast plain under a flaming sky, the
problem of the nature of the criminal—an atavistic being who reproduces in his
person the ferocious instincts of primitive humanity and the inferior animals. Thus
were explained anatomically the enormous jaws, high cheek-bones, prominent
superciliary arches, solitary lines in the palms, extreme size of the orbits, handleshaped or sessile ears found in criminals, savages, and apes, insensibility to pain,
extremely acute sight, tattooing, excessive idleness, love of orgies, and the irresistible craving for evil for its own sake, the desire not only to extinguish life in the
victim, but to mutilate the corpse, tear its flesh, and drink its blood. (xxv)
Relying heavily on the interpretation of physical appearance, Lombroso's theory lent
credence to an intuition that every schoolyard bully, Wild West vigilante, and road-rageready motorist might support: that one can tell by appearance alone that certain people
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are "unsavory criminal types." The concept resembles today's controversial law
enforcement practice of racial profiling, an apparently abused but arguably notaltogether-indefensible police practice of selecting potential suspects based on criminal
race demographics (Kennedy).
Lombroso believed that criminals were biologically inferior to evolutionarily
advanced, law-abiding, morally upright people. He believed that a significant percentage
of criminality was inherited and that certain "born criminals" represented a lower stage in
human evolution. Children, lower animals, and criminal adults represented primitive,
lawless phases along the phylogenetic and ontogenetic path to adult morality and
lawfulness. Criminals possessed physical traits Lombroso called "stigmata," which, to a
trained eye, could clearly identify a person's past, present, and potential criminality.
Stigmata betraying criminal proclivities included such traits as long arms, low and
narrow forehead, large ears, thick skull, large jaw, hairy chest, brown skin, tattoos, and
decreased sensitivity to pain.
Lombroso argued that punishments should not fit the crime as much as the
criminal

imposing more lenient sentences upon criminals whose actions seemed

compelled by passion or circumstances, and harsher sentences upon "biological"
criminals. Characterizing Lombroso's followers as self-described "enlightened
modernists" tending towards liberal and socialist politics, Gould believes that their
movement was tragic "because it shifted so much attention from the social basis of
crime to fallacious ideas about the innate propensity of criminals" (Mismeasure 141).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, with the increasing acceptance of
Mendelian genetics and improved understanding of the mechanisms of heredity,

Facing 12

A juvenile and adult
chimpanzee showing the greater
resemblance of humans to the
baby and illustrating the principle of neoteny in human evolution.
Figure 2-1. Evidence of Neoteny in Chimpanzees. (Mismeasure 332)
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recapitulation could no longer be sustained as a feasible hypothesis. The developmental
theory that superceded it, neoteny (also called paedomorphism), was proposed in 1909 by
W. Garstang and J. Kallman. It hypothesized that the human developmental sequence
from embryo and fetus through infant and juvenile to adult actually represents a retarding
and truncating of the developmental sequence followed by the ancestral species from
which humans evolved. Humans' longer juvenile dependency—neoteny hypothesized—
shows that humans experience a prolonged period of juvenile growth not experienced by
chimps, gorillas, and other primates. The most important consequence of this slowed
development and prolonged growth is the development of an enlarged brain. The
functional capabilities enabled by our more highly developed brain—determinists and
environmentalists agree

sets us far apart from other species on earth. Figure 2-1,

reproduced from Gould's Mismeasure of Man, illustrates the remarkable physical
resemblance between the juvenile chimpanzee (upright posture, vertical jaw, small and
flat face) and the adult human, while showing that the adult chimpanzee loses these
characteristics in subsequent growth stages unshared by humans. Among contemporary
evolutionary biologists, neoteny still retains general support (with some zones of
disagreement).
Neoteny, despite its complete contradiction of recapitulation, was nonetheless
embraced by many determinists. Gould highlights what he perceives as the complete
reversal of determinist consensus that occurred as neoteny first gained acceptance.
Scientists who had hitherto expended great energy gathering data to argue similarities
between apes, the adults of "lower" races, and the children of "higher" races now were
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attempting to prove that "higher" races were more developmentally retarded than
"lower" races.
One such scientist was the Dutch anatomist, Louis Bolk, who believed that
Negroes pass through a developmental stage that has already become the final stage for
Caucasians. In 1929 Bolk wrote that "qualitative differences in fetalization and retardation are the base of racial inequality. Looked at from this point of view, the division of
mankind into higher and lower races is fully justified. . . . The white race appears to be
the most progressive, as being the most retarded" (qtd. in Gould, Ontogeny 358). With
ostensible objectivity at his side, Bolk strove to validate the presumed superiority of his
own race.
In addition to recapitulation and neoteny, other biological determinist efforts in
the last two centuries have aimed to rank sexes, races, and nationalities by measurable
parameters such as skull volume, brain weight, and IQ test score. In numbers, there is a
tangible and ineluctable power that is lacking in mere qualitative theory. "Numbers don't
lie" is the aphorism, an aphorism with which Gould often disagrees. Many of his essays
are devoted to criticism of scientists' numbers—the methods by which they are obtained,
the contexts in which they are applied, and the perceptional schema through which they
are interpreted.
The goal of the nineteenth-century Philadelphia physician, Samuel Morton, was
to validate polygenism scientifically, the concept that Caucasians, Negroes, and Native
Americans represent distinctly different biological species. Morton's specialty was
the measurement of human skull volume, which he pursued with great fervor (as his
career collection of six hundred skulls attests). Morton measured the volumes of skulls
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obtained worldwide. His technique was to pour mustard seeds into the skull's foramen
magnum until the skull was full, and then to pour the seeds out into a graduated cylinder
for precise measurement. Morton computed statistical summary data on skull volume for
a number of racial groups, and published his comparative findings in charts such as
Table 1-1, which appeared in his 1839 book, Crania Americana:

Table 1-1. Summary of Internal Cranial Capacity (in cu. in.) by Race. (Morton)
RACE

N

MEAN

LARGEST

SMALLEST

Caucasian

52

87

109

75

Mongolian

10

83

93

69

Malay

18

81

89

64

[Native] American

144

82

100

60

Ethiopian

29

78

94

65

Morton's book presents a methodical analysis of the races of the globe, with each
race's chapter being organized primarily into elaborately detailed cranial description and
sociocultural commentary. The book is exquisitely illustrated with lithographs of human
skulls. Of the American Indian, Morton wrote:
The intellectual faculties of the great [Native American] family appear to be of a
decidedly inferior caste when compared with the Caucasian or Mongolian races.
They are not only averse to the restraints of education, but for the most part
incapable of a continued process of reasoning on abstract subjects. . . . Their
proximity for more than two centuries to European institutions, has made scarcely
any appreciable change in their mode of thinking or manner of life; and as to their
own social condition, they probably resemble in most respects what they were at
the primitive epoch of their existence.... However much the benevolent mind may
regret the inaptitude of the Indian for civilization, the affirmation of this question
seems to be established beyond a doubt. (81-82)
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The book makes frequent allusions to different racial groups' apparent statuses along a
ranked continuum of civilization and progress and is highly critical of the Negro and
Native American capacity for social, cultural, and political achievement.
Gould obtained access in 1977 to Morton's original skull collection and to his
experimental notes, and considers them to be clear indicators that Morton's experiments
were finagled attempts to create data supportive of an a priori conclusion—namely that
Caucasian skulls were larger than those of other races. He notes in The Mismeasure of
Man that the averages listed in the above chart are incorrect because they represent
Morton's selective bias favoring the inclusion of certain racial subsamples over others
(57-60). For example, Morton excluded many of his Hindu skulls (a smaller-brained
White subsample) because reporting them would have brought the Caucasian mean
down to 84.4. He included a disproportionately large number of Peruvian Inca skulls
(a smaller-brained Native American subsample), which, if weighted equally along with
other Native American subgroups, would have brought the Native American mean up to
83.8.
Gould found several key methodological flaws in Morton's work, including a
failure to account for known correlations of skull size with age, sex, and body stature.
Also, Morton's notes indicated that his measurements switched from mustard seed to lead
shot between 1839 and 1844, and Gould observed, much to his surprise, that lead shot
consistently gave higher and more reproducible measurements than mustard seed. Gould
re-measured the Crania Americana skulls by the lead shot method and found that for
Ethiopians, Native Americans, and Caucasians, the mustard seed results published by
Morton were lower by 5.4, 2.2, and 1.8 cubic inches, respectively. To Gould, these
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numbers represent proof that the Morton's mustard seed results were finagled consciously or subconsciously to fit a preordained conclusion about racial ranking
(Mismeasure 68). The manipulation, Gould speculates, probably consisted of tamping
and shaking of the easily-compressible mustard seeds in order to produce the desired
measurement.
Another nineteenth-century biological determinist was the French professor of
medicine, Paul Broca, who studied brain size and weight. From his observations, Broca
asserted that the brains of upper class White men of western European extraction were
larger than the brains of women, of other races, and of other social classes. Broca
inferred social superiority directly from his observations, and invoked the argument—
perennially recurrent among biological determinists

that those social classes with

proven lower brain measurements were incapable of significant learning, and a resource
drain to attempt to educate.
In The Mismeasure of Man Gould cites numerous examples of circular reasoning
in which Broca dismissed his own observations for no apparent reason other than their
dissonance with his a priori conclusions. For example, in addressing the argument that
women's brains might be smaller because women's body's are smaller, Broca confuses
hypothesis with established fact:
We must not forget that women are, on average, a little less intelligent than men, a
difference which we should not exaggerate but which is, nonetheless, real. We are
therefore permitted to suppose that the relatively small size of the female brain
depends in part upon her physical inferiority and in part upon her intellectual
inferiority (qtd. in Gould, Mismeasure 104).
His hypothesis (not his established fact) was that women are less intelligent as proven by
a smaller average brain weight than men. Gould cites the contemporary South African
anthropologist, P.V. Tobias, who argues that brain size bears no relationship to intern-
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gence, and that any variation Broca may have observed may be attributed to differences
in age, height, body size, nutritional level, and specimen handling (Mismeasure 111-112).
Near the beginning of the twentieth century, proponents of biological determinism
turned away from the concrete physical measurement of physiological structures such as
brains and skulls. They redirected their considerable energies into the more abstract (and
slippery) realm of psychometric testing, otherwise known as Intelligence or IQ testing.
The goal remained the same: to paint an ostensibly incontrovertible scientific proof that
certain groups of human beings are biologically inferior and, therefore, deserve inferior
social, political, and economic status.
The concept of "intelligence testing" was introduced in 1905 by the French
psychologist, Alfred Binet. In The Mismeasure of Man, Gould paints Binet as a wellintentioned educator whose chief motivation was the development of an effective method
for early identification of children in need of special education services. This would
permit those children to be given the added training that they needed to cope with the
practical tasks of everyday living.
Binet described his tests as measuring a cluster of important practical skills, but
made no claim to the existence of a single measurable entity called "intelligence"
(Lippman 562). He based his test questions on real-life, practical problems of logic,
counting, and spatial understanding relevant to the child's ability to cope with tasks of
everyday living. Binet did not see intelligence as a single fixed quantity, and feared that
educators would misinterpret the utility of his tests and use them with "brutal pessimism"
to the detriment of those children who needed help (Kamin, "Pioneers" 477).
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Unfortunately, by Gould's account, Binet's work was often distorted and abused to
simply isolate underachieving children, removing resources from those children most in
need of special help. Indeed, had Binet lived beyond 1911, he would have witnessed the
driving force of intelligence testing research and development shift quickly from his own
altruistic motives to motives more attuned to eugenics, forced sterilization, and racial
segregation. Binet had unintentionally sparked the hereditarian theory of IQ.
During the second decade of this century, Henry Goddard was research director at
New Jersey's Vineland Training School for Feeble-minded Girls and Boys. As one of
the first to promote intelligence testing in the United States, Goddard asserted that
intelligence was a unified mental entity that was measurable along a unilinear, rankable
scale. The lower end of this scale was populated, in order of decreasing ability, by
"morons," "imbeciles," and "idiots." He viewed intelligence as strictly inherited from
generation to generation, and feared that both the immigration of foreign morons and the
unrestricted reproduction of domestic morons jeopardized the nation's well-being.
Intelligence studies and theories by Goddard and by the American psychologists
Howard Yerkes of Harvard (the 1917 "Army Study"), Carl Brigham of Princeton (in the
1920s), and Louis Terman of Stanford (between 1910 and 1935) successfully disseminated biological determinist views widely among the general public. They also helped to
effect tangible social policy changes in the United States.
Hereditarian arguments based on intelligence testing persist to this day and have
generally followed the same pattern as those based on physical measurements (such as
Broca's brains or Morton's skulls). They have interpreted test measurements as
suggesting that inherent biological group differences exist among races, ethnicities, or
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social classes

and subtly or not-so-subtly advocated conservative, exclusionary social

policy changes. From the 1960s through the present day, hereditarian theories with
controversial social ramifications have been advanced by academics like Berkeley
psychologist emeritus, Arthur Jensen; the American Enterprise Institute fellow, Charles
Murray; the late Harvard psychologist, Richard Herrnstein; the British psychology
professor, Richard Lynn; and the University of Western Ontario professor, J. P. Rushton.
The 1994 publication of Herrnstein and Murray's popular book, The Bell Curve, is a
strong indication of the extent to which biological determinist views are still embedded in
the American psyche. Chapter 3, "Ideas Matter," will discuss what Gould perceives as
the serious social ramifications of twentieth-century intelligence testing.

2.2

Behold—or Imagine—The Great Ladder of Progress

But recapitulation, neoteny, and measurements of physical and mental ability are not
the only weapons within the biological determinist arsenal. Intrinsic to the hereditarian
ethos are distinct beliefs about the role of humans—especially particular subgroups of
humans—within the time-space continuum of life on earth. If recapitulation, neoteny,
skull and brain measurement, and intelligence testing could be considered the "oils" of
biological determinism, the "great ladder of progress" can be considered its canvas.
Or, like a musical "rest," the ladder is often as significant as the bolder elements superimposed on it, and often goes unrecognized in the background of thought. Seeing
dangerous implications in subconsciously grounded assumptions, Stephen Jay Gould
repeatedly uses his essays to call attention to and criticize our concept of progress.
The "ladder of progress" comprises the often subliminal assumptions and beliefs
that we as humans often harbor about our species' importance in the scheme of life on
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earth (or, indeed, the universe). Intimately tied with both religious "creation stories"
and with Western utilitarian philosophy—and enlisting the support of Darwinistic
interpretations wherever plausible—the "ladder of progress" is the tacit but widely held
species-ist opinion that humans were somehow predestined to rise above other species
and dominate nature. By extension, it also encompasses the racially biased assumption
that certain groups of humans have been preordained by nature to rise above other human
groups. The ladder's chief tenet is that evolutionary history has consisted of a forwardmarching progression of life from creation to the present, with humans representing the
preordained pinnacle of this process. The ladder is consistent with the Platonic concept
of an essential and universal Natural Law, driving ever forward toward a preordained
goal.
This writer (and I suspect a majority of lay people in Western nations over several
recent generations) took from his elementary and secondary school science training the
notion the Darwinian evolution represented a straight line of gradual change over time.
We had learned that bacteria evolved into amoeba, which somehow evolved into small
multi-celled marine life, then into fishes, then amphibians, then into mammals, then into
hominid antecedents like the Cro-Magnon. Homo sapiens evolved as the last link on this
chain or "ladder of progress."
But in essays collected in books such as Ever Since Darwin, The Flamingo's Smile,
Bully for Brontosaurus, Dinosaur in a Haystack, and Wonderful Life, Gould repeatedly
stresses his view that this is not the way evolution occurred at all. Much to our discomfort in considering the full implications of the statement, Gould considers evolution
purposeless, non-progressive, and materialistic

far from the preordained and unilinear
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process it is often considered. Life on earth has evolved not as a ladder or a march,
Gould claims, but rather in a "punctuated equilibrium" involving a rich "bush" of coeval
species interrelated by genealogical branches and twigs. Long stretches of species stasis
have been punctuated by sudden and geologically brief periods of rapid, unpredictable
change, often resulting in extinctions. Gould believes that the element of chance played
such a pivotal role that it is highly unlikely the evolutionary process could rerun to the
same current result.
According to Gould, the chief driving force of evolutionary change is not progress,
but contingency and chance: "Humans are not the end result of predictable evolutionary
progress, but rather a fortuitous cosmic afterthought, a tiny little twig on the enormously
arborescent bush of life, which, if replanted from seed, would almost surely not grow this
twig again, or perhaps any twig with any property that we would care to call consciousness" (Dinosaur 327). As one support he cites current theories that an extraterrestrial
body's collision with the earth was responsible for the extinction of dinosaurs, and
contends that without this cosmic happenstance, mammals might not have risen and
humans might not have evolved. In Wonderful Life, while describing the diversity of new
(but now mostly extinct) multi-cellular species that arose 500 million years ago during a
brief but critical geological period called the Cambrian Explosion, Gould comments that
the seemingly insignificant survival of one worm-like genus at that time, Pikaia—the
first known chordate

was a prerequisite for human existence today.

But what has evolutionary change to do with biological determinism? One of
Gould's recurrent subjects is the inextricability of science from its cultural context. The
concepts of cultural and biological progress are intertwined, according to Gould, and the
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perception of a forward-marching progression deeply pervades the culture and ideology
of Western civilization. In Dinosaur in a Haystack, he describes the duality of change
versus constancy as a politically charged mental construct: "A fundamental tenet of
Western life, at least since the late eighteenth century, has proclaimed change as natural,
constant, and inevitable. . . . Evolution is a fact of nature

one that could probably not

have been perceived, and certainly not widely promulgated, before preference for change
in this cardinal duality swept the Western world" (134).
The utilitarian concept of progress implies the inferiority and undesirability of that
which came before, the unspoken urge to advance and improve, and the freedom (indeed,
even the duty) to eradicate what is perceived as imperfection. A clear example of this
sentiment is found in this passage on Native Americans from the appendix of Samuel
Morton's Crania Americana, written by George Combe, a lawyer and phrenology
proponent who was Morton's friend and supporter:
The aspect of America is still more deplorable than that of Africa. Surrounded for
centuries by European knowledge, enterprise and energy, and incited to improvement by the example of European institutions, many of the nations of that continent
remain at the present time the same miserable, wandering, houseless and lawlesss
savages that their ancestors were, when Columbus first set foot upon their soil. . .
It is certainly a striking and mysterious fact that a race of men should thus have
continued for ages stationary in a state of the rudest barbarism, that tendency to
improvement, a principle that has been thought more than perhaps any other to
distinguish man from the lower animals, would seem to be totally wanting in them.
Generation after generation passes away, and no traces of advancement distinguish
the last from the first. (272)
Combe's repugnance for Native Americans is blatantly manifest in this passage. In the
words of the language scholar, Steven Katz, the sense of progress can foster a dangerous
"ethic of expediency" in which scientific, technological, and perceived societal advancement become in themselves subsuming moral ends, justifiable at any cost, even if the
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ends involve the displacement of a Native people or atrocities like the Holocaust (Katz
257, 2 62, 265).
The twentieth century has seen biological determinism align itself with the ethic of
progress and expediency—commanding respect for its perceived objectivity; influencing
public opinion, social policy, and legislation; and affecting, sometimes tragically, the
lives of millions of people. Having confined the discussion thus far to hereditarian
theory, in the next chapter we will explore through Gould's eyes some of the palpable,
real-life ramifications of biological determinism's emphasis on progress and linear
ranking.

CHAPTER 3
"IDEAS MATTER"

Ideas can have important social consequences with impacts upon the lives of
millions. Old notions may emerge later, often in curiously altered contexts, but
their source can still be recognized and traced to claims made in the name of
science yet never really supported by more than the social prejudices (often
unrecognized) of their proposers. Ideas matter in tangible ways.
Stephen Jay Gould (Flamingo 321)

As with the atom bomb, birth control technology, or genetic engineering, the most
controversial manifestations of science are those with distinctly practical relevance.
Biological determinism, especially in its interpretation of evolutionary science, is no
exception. If hypotheses about skull volume, brain weight, and intelligence testing were
an isolated field of inquiry
academics

set apart from the real world as ivory tower musings of

biological determinism would likely have waned long ago. But its longevity

and vitality bespeak a deeply rooted relevance to the day-to-day function of governments,
economic and educational systems, and individual lives. According to Gould, biological
determinism is almost always cited as justification for social action, social policy, or
maintaining the social status quo. This chapter will examine palpable examples of
hereditarianism in action.

3.1 A Thumb on the Scale—The A Priori Judgment in Action
Biological determinist ideology ripples throughout American history as a support for
slavery, for the American invasion of the Philippines in 1899, for forced sterilization of
the mentally retarded, for strict immigration restriction laws of the 1920s, and for the
recent upswing in the anti-welfare and anti-affirmative action sentiment. Worldwide, its
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stretch has reached from Nazi Germany to Singapore. Through popular books like The
Bell Curve (1994), millions of contemporary readers have been exposed to biological
determinist ideology.
In The Mismeasure of Man, Gould emphasizes that hereditarianism has been
promoted not through the crackpot musings of marginal scientists, but rather by the
serious work of premier scientists at the forefront of their fields. One example was the
renowned naturalist / paleontologist / geologist, Louis Agassiz (1807-1873)

whose

Harvard professorship Gould now occupies. For achievements that included groundbreaking studies of fish fossils and the discovery of geological evidence for ice ages,
Agassiz was perhaps the most widely respected naturalist of his time. What is it about
Agassiz that Gould finds objectionable? Agassiz believed strongly that different human
races represented different species. This and his widespread credibility helped provide a
scientific rationalization for pro-slavery sentiments (Lurie 1: 73).
By denying that his scientific theories possessed political ramifications, Agassiz
avoided openly acknowledging that his polygenistic views defended slavery:
. . Let the politicians, let those who feel themselves called upon to regulate
human society, see what they can do with the results. . . . We disclaim, however,
all connection with any question involving political matters. It is simply with
reference to the possibility of appreciating the differences they have originated
all over the world, and under what circumstances, that we have here tried to trace
some facts respecting the human races. (qtd. in Gould, Mismeasure 45)
The inquiry for objective truth is Agassiz's only avowed interest here, not political
influence. But Gould presents Aggassiz's defense as an archetypically-veiled
rationalization for discrimination against Negroes, citing the following personal
correspondence to his mother after Agassiz had been served by Negro waiters at a
Philadelphia hotel restaurant:
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In seeing their black faces with their thick lips and grimacing teeth, the wool on
their head, their bent knees, their elongated hands, their large curved nails, and
especially the livid color of the palm of their hands, I could not take my eyes off
their face in order to tell them to stay far away. And when they advanced that
hideous hand towards my plate in order to serve me, I wished I were able to depart
in order to eat a piece of bread elsewhere, rather than dine with such service.
(qtd. in Gould, Mismeasure 45)
Though such overt racial bias may not have been uncommon among statesmen and scientists of the Civil War era, it is difficult to imagine this frame of mind not influencing the
objectivity of the scientist.
Gould describes a series of letters written by Agassiz to S. G. Howe, a member
of Abraham Lincoln's administration, who had solicited Agassiz's opinion about the
optimal post-war role of Negroes. In his advice to Howe, Agassiz acknowledged the
importance of granting legal equality to Negroes, but balked at the suggestion that they
be afforded true social equality:
Social equality I deem at all time impracticable. It is a natural impossibility
flowing from the very character of the Negro race. . . . No man has a right to what
he is unfit to use. . . . Let us beware of granting too much to the negro race in the
beginning, lest it become necessary to recall violently some of the privileges which
they may use to our detriment and their own injury. (qtd. by Gould, Mismeasure
48)
These were not the isolated musings of an ivory tower academic. These were words that
reflected and reinforced racially oppressive sentiment widespread in the American South
after the Civil War. It is easy to suspect that thoughts such as these contributed to an
intellectual bulwark, both spoken and unspoken, that kept Jim Crow alive for the next
one hundred years in the American South.
Recapitulationist theory (subsequently disproved entirely by the theory of neoteny
/ paedomorphism) was easily applied in the political realm in support of colonialism.
Because it ranked the adults of undeveloped nations with the children of civilized
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nations, the logical inference was that the people of underdeveloped nations were unfit
to govern themselves. Reverend Josiah Strong was a prominent New York cleric who,
in this 1900 rebuttal, criticized Henry Clay for expressing doubts about the morality of
this inference :
Clay's conception was formed when the old carpenter theory of the universe
obtained, before modern science had shown that races develop in the course
of centuries as individuals do in years, and that an undeveloped race, which is
incapable of self-government is no more of a reflection on the Almighty than is
an undeveloped child who is incapable of self-government. The opinions of
men who in this enlightened day believe that the Filipinos are capable of selfgovernment because everybody is, are not worth considering. (Strong 289-290)
Not a tolerant view from this man of the cloth, but cited by Gould as clearly illustrative
of the cultural-political embeddedness of both religion and science. Gould alludes to a
similar view propounded by British philosopher, Benjamin Kidd, who in 1898 argued
that tropical Africa was manifestly fit for colonization because its "child-like" natives
were so obviously unfit to govern themselves (Ontogeny 131). Africa's wholesale subdivision into colonies ensued.
Although twentieth-century biological determinism has downplayed physical
measurement comparisons in favor of the more abstract concept of intelligence differences, its goal of influencing social policy persisted. New Jersey's Henry Goddard
championed the first spirited association of intelligence testing with social advocacy.
He argued that intelligence constituted a raw material critically important to the
construction of a sound society:
The significance of [intelligence testing] for human progress and efficiency can
hardly be appreciated at once. Whether we are thinking of children or adults it
enables us to know a very fundamental fact about the human material. The importance of this in building up the cooperative society such as every community aims
to be, is very great. The mechanical engineer could never build bridges or houses if
he did not know accurately the strength of materials, how much of a load each will
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support. Of how infinitely greater importance is it then we seek to build up a social
structure that we should know the strength of our materials. (28-29)
Goddard saw intelligence testing as a means to assure that every person assumed a
position in society commensurate with his or her intellectual raw material. He also
equated lower levels of measured intelligence with antisocial tendencies, stating that
"every investigation of the mentality of criminals, misdemeanants, delinquents, and
other antisocial groups has proven beyond the possibility of contradiction that nearly
all persons in these classes and in some cases all are of low mentality" (72).
Highly concerned about what he saw as an excessive number of morons in
America, Goddard performed a study of newly arriving immigrants at New York's Ellis
Island in 1912. Often illiterate and without adequate knowledge of English, immigrants
were selected (by Goddard's own procedural description) for visible signs of possible
mental defectiveness and asked to take an intelligence test. The process by which
Goddard and his assistants selected participants is, in itself, a case study of "thumb-onthe-scale," a priori bias. According to Gould's examination of Goddard's experiment
notes, Goddard instructed his assistants to pick out the feeble-minded by sight and to
exclude the "obviously normal" from the sample (Gould, Mismeasure 165). Though he
would subsequently promote it as an objective study, the experimenter's subjective
impressions about what people "look like" were well apparent.
Goddard's report concluded that among arriving immigrants, 83 percent of the
Jews, 80 percent of the Hungarians, 79 percent of the Italians, and 87 percent of the
Russians were indeed morons. He advocated strict immigration policies to combat the
influx of such feeble-mindedness into the United States and took satisfaction that the
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number of immigrants deported for feeble-mindedness increased several fold in 1913 and
1914 (Gould, Mismeasure 168).
Goddard's concern, echoed by other twentieth-century determinists, was that
American social fabric was under attack on two fronts: 1) the immigration of mentally
inferior people, and 2) the unregulated reproduction of mentally inferior people already
here. The enactment of several forced-sterilization laws nationwide attests to the popularity of Goddard's "moronic threat" view on the domestic level. A 1913 Iowa law, for
example, dedicated itself to "the prevention of the procreation of criminals, rapists, idiots,
feeble-minded, imbeciles, lunatics, drunkards, drug fiends, epileptics, syphilitics, moral
and sexual perverts, and diseased and degenerate persons" (Kamin, "Pioneers" 484).
The 1917 Army Study on Intelligence by Harvard psychologist Robert Yerkes—
as well as its subsequent interpretation and nationwide popularization by psychologists
Louis Terman of Stanford and Carl Brigham of Princeton—helped propel "IQ Testing"
into national consciousness and fostered the legislative atmosphere that enacted the
strictest immigration regulations in the nation's history. Gould characterizes Robert
Yerkes as a psychologist dissatisfied with his field's lack of respect among "hard
sciences," such as physics and chemistry. To counter this image, Gould suggests, Yerkes
discerned the tremendous increase in prestige and credibility that would accompany the
injection of quantitative method into psychology.
The U.S. Army commissioned Yerkes to provide mental assessment protocols that
would aid in the job classification of draftees. Yerkes developed a "point scale" version
of Billet's test, deliverable in two formats: "Alpha" for administration to English
speakers, and the more visually oriented "Beta" format for those who had not mastered
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English. The Army Study tested over two million men, and would prove to be the most
extensive IQ study done to that date.
Its results provided extensive intelligence data for a wide variety of racial and
ethnic groups, and fuel for the biological determinists. Yerkes's study reported an
intelligence hierarchy based on nationality, with primarily Nordic and Teutonic countries
(such as Canada, Britain, and Scandinavia) at the top, and Latin, Slavic, and Eastern
European countries (such as Italy, Hungary and Poland) at the bottom. It was also the
first study to show a higher average intelligence score for American Whites as compared
to American Blacks.
Yerkes wrote the foreword to Carl Brigham's 1923 work, A Study of American
Intelligence. Commenting there on Brigham's application of the Army Study to immigration advocacy, Yerkes wrote that "the author presents not theories and opinions but
facts. It behooves us to consider their reliability and their meaning, for no one of us as a
citizen can afford to ignore the menace of race deterioration or the evident relations of
immigration to national progress and welfare" (Yerkes vii-viii).
In his 1923 work, A Study of American Intelligence, Carl Brigham invoked
Darwinian theory to draw hereditarian conclusions from the Army data:
If intelligence counts for anything in the competition among human beings, it is
natural to expect that individuals of superior intelligence will adjust themselves
more easily to their physical and social environment, and that they will endow their
children not only with material goods, but with the ability to adjust themselves to
the same or a more complex environment. To select individuals who have fallen
behind in the struggle to adjust themselves to the civilization their race has built as
typical of that race is an error, for their position itself shows that they are, for the
most part, individuals with an inferior hereditary endowment. (194)
Brigham's staunch advocacy helped afford the scientific legitimacy required by Congress
to pass the Johnson-Lodge Immigration Act of 1924. Though neither Brigham nor
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Yerkes testified at congressional hearings, their influence was manifest in the frequent
allusions made to their work by witnesses such as Harry Laughlin, Expert Eugenics
Agent of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization (Kamin, "Pioneers"
499-500). The Johnson-Lodge act successfully rolled back annual immigration from
Southern and Eastern European countries to quotas representing two percent of each
nationality's American representation in the 1890 American census. No such restriction
was imposed on immigration from Northern or Western European countries. The quotas
remained in effect throughout the 1930s, denying entrance to large numbers of German
Jews who were attempting to leave Germany. About these people, Gould writes
eloquently, "we know what happened to many who wished to leave but had nowhere to
go. The paths to destruction are often indirect, but ideas can be agents as sure as guns
and bombs" (Mismeasure 233).
Although Gould acknowledges the Army Study's widespread impact, he criticizes
Yerkes's protocol as providing recruits with inadequate instructions, dim light, a highly
stressful ambiance, and culturally loaded questions (e.g., asking what is missing from a
picture of a gramophone lacking a sound horn) (Mismeasure 200). He also faults Yerkes
for failing to separate genetic and environmental components from his data. To Gould,
Yerkes was a scientist who

supported by the societal power structure

abandoned

objectivity to advance a priori conclusions reinforcing that structure. In this case, the
thumb was under the scale of Blacks and other "inherently less intelligent races," whom
Yerkes believed he had proved uneducable to the same level as Whites (Ever Since 243).
Gould notes with interest Brigham's interpretations of two Army Study findings
that contradicted determinist tenets. The first was the observation that median intelli-
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Figure 3-1. Army Study: Average Immigrant Test Performance vs. Years of Residence.
(Brigham 94)
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gence scores of Blacks from four northern states (Illinois, New York, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania) were significantly higher than the median scores of Whites from four
southern states (Mississippi, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Georgia) (Bond 597). In A Study
of American Intelligence, Brigham did not address this "northern Black over southern
White" detail; he wrote instead only that the Army study detected a superiority of
northern Blacks over southern Blacks:
The superior intelligence measurements of the northern negro [sic] are due to three
factors: first, the greater amount of educational opportunity, which does affect, to
some extent, scores on our present intelligence tests; second, the greater amount of
admixture of white blood; and third, wages, better living condition, identical school
privileges, and a less complete social ostracism, tending to draw the more intelligent negro to the North. (192)
Thus, while acknowledging a minimal role for limited environmental influence, Brigham
managed to infuse his discussion of this discrepancy with an essentially hereditarian tone.
One cannot help but admire Brigham's skill as a rhetorician. Heads, he wins; tails, an
unfavored race loses.
A second Army Study obstacle for Brigham's determinism was its demonstration that, after twenty years of U.S. residency, the intelligence test performance of
immigrant recruits equaled that of "native born" Americans. Figure 3-1, reproduced
from Brigham's A Study of American Intelligence, illustrates the phenomenon. Gould
criticizes Brigham for failing to acknowledge the more plausible environmentalist
hypothesis for the phenomenon depicted in this graph—that test-taking ability increased
as immigrants became more acclimated to American customs and language. In The
Mismeasure of Man, Gould argues that Brigham simply assumed a priori that his tests
measured innate intelligence, and applied the "tails you lose" tactic to his rhetorical
counterattack by claiming that the intellectual caliber of recent immigrants (who were
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predominantly from Eastern and Southern Europe) must be inferior to that of past
immigrants (who contained a much higher number Northern Europeans, or "Nordics,"
Brigham's favored racial group) (Mismeasure 228). Figure 3-2 was employed by
Brigham to illustrate the Army Study's differing performance distributions for Nordics,
Mediterraneans, and American Blacks—and to argue against racial interbreeding:

Figure 3-2. Army Study: Intelligence Testing Distributions by Race. (Brigham 200-201)

Brigham founded the College Entrance Examination Board, helped develop the
first version of the SAT college-entrance exam, and was a board member of Educational
Testing Service in Princeton, New Jersey. It is disconcerting to note that so prominent a
figure as Brigham once wrote that "running parallel with [European immigration trends]
we have the most sinister development in the history of this continent, the importation of
the negro" (xxi) and that "the able Jew is popularly recognized not only because of his
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ability, but also because he is able and a Jew " (190). It might be argued that the first
remark was intended to express indignation at the institution of slavery. In view of
Brigham's penchant for racial ranking and the order he propounded, this seems unlikely.
With advocates like Goddard, Brigham, and Stanford psychologist Lewis Terman
(the developer of the highly standardized and widely distributed Stanford-Binet intelligence test), laws permitting forced sterilization of the developmentally disabled and of
others deemed "mentally defective" became more and more common. By 1935, about
20,000 forced sterilizations had been performed in the United States based on
sterilization-warranting "hereditary" conditions that included alcoholism, drug addiction,
blindness, and deafness in some states (Flamingo 309).
Researcher Nancy Gallagher notes that although California led the nation in
eugenic sterilization laws, even small states such as Vermont joined the trend. The
Vermont Eugenics Survey of the 1920s and 1930s culminated in the 1931 Vermont law
allowing for the sterilization of the feeble-minded and handicapped. In a recent interview
she emphasized that such laws did not arise as isolated aberrations; they were often
enmeshed with progressive or even liberal social welfare reform issues like Special
Education and other reforms affecting children (Gallagher). Her research on the Vermont
Eugenics Survey indicates that it targeted the poor, families in trouble, unwed teenage
mothers, and Abenaki Indians. The Abenakis were a northeastern tribe whose reluctance
to abandon itinerant traditions and accept American culture had made them unpopular.
Gould would quickly point out the equation of unpopularity with mental inferiority here.
Gould's gift for inspiring human empathy through his writing is typified in "Carrie
Buck's Daughter," a case study of a one such victim of the eugenic movement. In 1924,
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Carrie Buck, a resident of the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and the Feeble-Minded
in Lynchburg, became the plaintiff in a case argued all the way to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Both she and her mother (also deemed feeble-minded) were residents, and Carrie
had recently given birth to an illegitimate daughter. In his oft-quoted 1927 pronouncement that "three generations of imbeciles are enough," Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes
delivered the majority opinion that her sterilization warrant should not be rescinded.
With touching irony, Gould relates the true story of Carrie Buck's incarceration. (It
is probable that she was institutionalized to protect the foster family relative that had
raped and impregnated her.) Dr. K. Ray Nelson, the director of the institution in 1980,
reexamined records of past residents and tracked down Carrie, who was still alive and
residing in a nearby town. His visits, along with those of reporters and scholars, found
her to be woman of normal intelligence (Flamingo 313). Carrie's daughter, Vivian, died
in 1932 at the age of eight. Gould obtained Vivian's last school report card and observed
average performance grades. With Wendell Holmes's "three generations of imbeciles"
statement exposed as erroneous, Gould comments: "I don't know that such correction of
cruel but forgotten errors of history counts for much, but I find it both symbolic and
satisfying to learn that forced eugenic sterilization, a procedure of such dubious morality,
earned its official justification (and won its most quoted line of rhetoric) on a patent
falsehood" (Flamingo 318). Ironically, contemporary pro-life groups, viewing abortion
as a procedure of dubious morality, might feel similarly about the ultimately recanted
rape claim initially charged in. Roe v. Wade.
Forays by late twentieth-century hereditarians into social and legislative advocacy
embrace intelligence testing as proof for innate race and class differences. For example,
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in 1969 Arthur Jensen argued in a Harvard Review article entitled "How Much Can We
Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" that perceived failures in remedial education
programs were not the result of children's environmental deprivations:
Compensatory education has been tried and apparently it has failed.
Compensatory education has been practiced on a massive scale for several
years in many cities across the nation. It began with auspicious enthusiasm and
high hopes of educators. It had unprecedented support from Federal funds. It had
theoretical sanction from social scientists espousing the major underpinning of its
rationale: the "deprivation hypothesis," according to which academic lag is mainly
the result of social, economic, and educational deprivation and discrimination—an
hypothesis that has met with wide, uncritical acceptance in the atmosphere of
society's growing concern about the plight of minority groups and the
economically disadvantaged.
The chief goal of compensatory education—to remedy the educational lag
of disadvantaged children and thereby narrow the achievement gap between
"minority" and "majority" pupils—has been utterly unrealized in any of the
large compensatory education programs that have been evaluated so far. (1)
Jensen ascribes the perceived problem, instead, to IQ's unresponsiveness to outside
(environmental) correction, citing monozygotic twin studies by Cyril Burt as support
(47). While acknowledging that environmental factors do play a role (especially with
regard to school grades, as opposed to IQ), he uses Cyril. Burt's twin studies to calculate
that 80 percent of variability in people's IQs can be attributed to hereditary causes.
According to Gould, the first of Jensen's unsupported assumptions—and the central
assumption of all hereditarian arguments about intelligence—is that there exists a single,
definite, reified entity called "intelligence" or "Spearman's g factor"* (after its principal
theorist, Charles Spearman). Second, while acknowledging that intelligence is molded by
environmental as well as genetic influences, it gave the genetic component the "controlling interest" by stating that intelligence was 80 percent heritable. Jensen's claims relied
on identical twin studies reported by the preeminent British psychologist and statistician,

Spearman's concept of g will be examined in Chapter 4.
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Cyril Burt (1883-1971). Studies of twins separated into different environments at birth
are considered the only valid experimental vehicle through which to study heredity-vs.environment phenomena.
Despite the discrediting of Jensen's argument, Gould uses it as an example of
the power of ostensibly objective scientific observation to influence political policy.
Although in 1976 Burt's twin studies would be exposed as having been based largely on
falsified data (Dorfrnan), Jensen's article was read by many, including Singapore Prime
Minister Lee Kwon Yew in the early 1980s. Lee had seen the statistic that collegeeducated women in Singapore gave birth on average to 1.65 children, while uneducated
women averaged 3.5 children. He then concluded that Singapore's status as a thriving
business center in the East would be undermined if the relatively high reproductive level
of less intelligent women were not countered.
Through a nationwide media campaign ostensibly motivated by concerns about
unintelligent masses enlarging their numerical advantage, Lee exhorted Singapore's
better-educated women to marry and have more children. In an essay in The Flamingo's
Smile, Gould rolls his eyes at Lee's citing of Jensen, and Jensen's citing of Burt, in a
veritable cascade of pseudo-scientific misinformation. Referring to Lee's wholesale
acceptance and promotion of Jensen's 80 / 20 "Nature / Nurture" ratio, Gould relates that
"it sent a frisson of déjà-vu up my spine" (Flamingo 324). To Gould, the Singapore
episode indicates that the plea for governmental intervention to curb reproduction of the
less intelligent is a worldwide phenomenon—and it is misinformed.
Political efforts for social reform that are undergirded by the hereditarian view
of intelligence have continued to be major issues throughout the final quarter of the
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twentieth century. During the 1960s the American physicist William Shockley, Nobel
prize-winning inventor of the transistor, proposed a monetary incentive system whereby
individuals with IQs below 100 would be compensated for undergoing voluntary sterilization (Gould, Mismeasure 28). The lower the IQ, the higher the compensation.
In 1971 the Harvard psychologist, Richard Herrnstein, published the article,
"IQ," in Atlantic Monthly. It claimed that socioeconomic class distinctions were chiefly
a function of inherited intelligence, and that

paradoxically—as society strives to

equalize opportunities for all through social programs, it strengthens the stratification
of an intelligence-based "meritocracy." In the article's 1973 companion book, 10 in the
Meritocracy, Herrnstein wrote:
The ties among I.Q., occupation, and social standing make practical sense. . If
virtually anyone is smart enough to be a ditch digger, and only half the people are
smart enough to be engineers, then society is, in effect, husbanding its intellectual
resources by holding engineers in greater esteem, and on the average, paying them
more. . . . The critics of testing say that the correlations between I.Q. and social
class show that the I.Q. test is contaminated by the arbitrary values of our culture,
giving unfair advantage to those who hold them. But it is no mere coincidence that
those values often put the bright people in the prestigious jobs. By directing its
approval, admiration, and money towards certain occupations, society promotes
their desirability, and hence, competition for them. (124)
Herrnstein wrote to confront what he described as the prevailing liberal-egalitarian
orthodoxy in psychology at the time, which he claimed had been suppressing discussion
of the social ramifications of intelligence's proven high heritability since the early days
of mental testing. He equated this egalitarianism with Marxism and with what he
perceived as failed "Great Society" programs of the 1960s.
Herrnstein contended that egalitarian efforts to equalize opportunity actually
engender "a society sharply graduated, with ever greater innate separation between the
top and the bottom and ever more uniformity as far as inherited abilities are concerned,"
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and he commented (perhaps disingenuously) that "naturally we fmd this vista appalling,
for we have been raised to think of social equality as our goal" (221). Herrnstein's
essential warning was that egalitarianism, with its alleged failure to recognize individuals' inherent mental differences, accentuates the dangerous class divisions that it aims
to equalize.
One of the most widely read recent works promoting hereditarian views on
intelligence was The Bell Curve, published in 1994 by Herrnstein and Charles Murray.
It advances Herrnstein's concept of a "cognitive elite," born as the unintended consequence of today's more equitable social opportunities and ever more sharply alienating
lower from upper classes:
The upshot is that the scattered brightest of the early twentieth century have
congregated, forming a new class. . . . Membership in this new class, the cognitive
elite, is gained by high IQ; neither social background, nor lack of money will bar
the way. But once in the club, usually by age eighteen, members begin to share
much else as well. Among other things, they will come to run much of the
country's business. In the private sector, the cognitive elite dominate the ranks of
CEOs and the top echelon of corporate executives. Smart people have no doubt
always had the advantage in commerce and industry, but their advantage has grown
as the barriers against the "wrong" nationalities, ethnicities, religions, or
socioeconomic origins have been dismantled. (510).

Herrnstein and Murray first dispute the strict environmentalist claim that parental
socioeconomic status and local educational opportunities are the major factors
determining intelligence and life success—and offer an alternative hypothesis in which
inheritance of parental intelligence plays the predominating role. The book's second
contention, strongly implied but never directly stated, is that demonstrable race
differences in IQ play predominating causal roles for crime, overpopulation, unemployment, and other social ills.
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The Bell Curve articulately promoted to a large popular audience the following
determinist tenets and related social policies:
•

Intelligence is a single, concrete, and verifiable entity that is easily quantifiable by one variable defined originally by Charles Spearman as "g."

•

IQ tests measure "g" very well, and "when properly administered, the tests
are not measurably biased against socioeconomic, ethnic, or racial groups.
They predict a wide variety of socially important outcomes" (15).

•

There exist differences in intelligence between groups of people, and these
differences are largely (though not entirely) inherited. Environmental
influences exist, but are not predominant.

•

Ethnic IQ differences correlate with differences in social traits such as crime,
illegitimacy, morality, and civic-mindedness.

•

People at the top and bottom of the socioeconomic ladder are in their
respective places primarily because of biological predestination, not
"nurture" or environment.

•

Egalitarianism is detrimental to society. Interventionist social policies such
as inner city supplemental education programs and Affirmative Action programs have failed. They have failed because the limitations of innate low
intelligence are insurmountable. Herrnstein and Murray believe that "the
egalitarian ideal of contemporary political theory underestimates the importance of the differences that separate human beings. It fails to come to grips
with human variation. It overestimates the ability of political interventions to
shape human character and capacities" (532).

•

Past hereditary and wealth-based inequities of social structure have now
been supplanted by a color-blind meritocracy that is based predominantly on
intelligence differences. Everyone is now free to assume his or her rightful
place on the hierarchy, based on intellectual merit.

Herrnstein and Murray, whose arguments will be explored further as this thesis
progresses, serve as the torch-bearers for a cadre of hereditarian theorists that also
includes Arthur Jensen, Richard Lynn, and J. P. Rushton. In the following section we
will examine the rhetorical techniques employed by some of these theorists—in the face
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of what Gould insists is a lack of demonstrable data—to disseminate biological
determinist views and gain support for related social policy.

3.2 Science and Rhetoric—Or, How to Win Friends and Eliminate People
It is one thing to theorize about eugenic sterilization or racial / class discrimination, but
it is yet another to persuade others successfully to one's cause. Gould's major selfappointed role is a counter-rhetorical one. With the aid of Kamin, Montague, and other
skeptics of biological determinism, Gould aims to expose and refute what he perceives as
the misuse of biological science to validate sociopolitical inequity.
"Propaganda" connotes the use of verbal underhandedness in argument and
persuasion. Its negative connotation generally assures that we apply the word only to
arguments to which we are opposed, so it is not surprising that hereditarians and
opponents such as Gould might dismiss many of each other's arguments as propaganda.
A reader may very well consider this thesis propaganda for its acknowledged positive
framing of Stephen Jay Gould's work. A truly impartial reader

aware of the frequently

rhetorical aspect of writing—must weigh the value of a written work with the author's
apparent motive in mind. Credibility should rest on the author's apparent honesty and
fairness of motive. The perspective of the evaluator— itselfprone to bias by personal
circumstance and belief systems—is key.
In day-to-day life, calculated misinformation is ubiquitous, but often hidden.
Historian Oliver Thomson, in his work, Mass Persuasion in History (1977), contends that
political persuasion can occur at an almost subliminal level wherein political assumptions
and preferences are easily presented as incontrovertible facts. He considers this insinuation of sociopolitical ideas into everyday experience with great concern:
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The spreading of these ideas is slow and insidious. It is not necessarily deliberate
or controlled by even an identifiable elite, but does quite genuinely trap whole
peoples in a lifetime of acquisitiveness or racial hatred or useless conflict or
obsessive puritanism. The ideas spread so widely that they become confused with
absolute truths. . . . It becomes evident that the most dangerous propaganda is the
kind which is not recognized as such at all, either by its audience or even by its
perpetrators. It is the steady drip, drip, drip of aggressive, prejudiced or materialist
ideas which those competing to be social leaders project through all the media in
their fight for personal success. (132)
It is just such an insinuative quality that Gould rallies to highlight in the work of
biological determinist theoreticians, and just the element that he labors hard in the details
to disentangle and lay bare for the non-scientific reader.
In A Rhetoric of Motives (1950), the rhetorician Kenneth Burke emphasizes the
human tendency to view others not as individuals, but as members of groups, classes, or
audiences that need to be wooed, courted, deceived, forced, or otherwise compelled
toward a particular way of thinking

in other words, as objects to be manipulated. To

rally people to our cause or belief system, Burke writes, we must convince them that we
identify with their own values, and that—in a world of Us 's and Them 's—we are an
empathetic member of their own superior group of Us 's, not of the evil, undesirable, or
untidy Them 's (19-27). Burke views mystery as a sort of awe-demanding smoke screen
whose purpose is to cloud people's discernment of the persuasive forces directed at them
(114-127, 331-332).
Although without direct reference to Burke or other rhetorical scholarship, Gould
portrays biological determinists as employing the rhetorical devices of identification
and mystery. Much as Gould himself is accused (by critics such as Frank Schmidt) of
"preaching to the choir" by propounding comforting egalitarian notions that many unscientific lay people want to hear, so too do the ideas of hereditarian theorists provide a
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comforting sense of identity to those occupying relatively privileged positions within
societies—telling them what they want to hear.
For example, in his book, Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence (1920),
Henry Goddard flattered his readers (courting their identification) by stating that only
readers of above-average intelligence would be interested in reading about intelligence
ranking (32). Determinist arguments are quick to align with a dispassionate and objective
science, in effect invoking science as a higher power, much as our less secular ancestors
might have invoked a deity to which blind faith was due.
It might be argued that science, despite its claims to dispassionate objectivity, is
just as much a mystery to the average human as any notion of a divine power—and
therefore just as potentially persuasive. To the common person, science may often be
perceived with the same sense of awe, intangibility, unprovability, mystery—and
credulous deference.
Gould describes the pro-slavery sympathies harbored by the polygenist Louis
Agassiz, who was considered by many to have been America's greatest nineteenthcentury biologist. Though Agassiz was known to be a highly religious man, he believed
Negroes were a separate species from Caucasians. This inconsistency causes Gould to
wonder whether Agassiz applied toward Negroes the biblical command to "love thy
neighbor" (Ever Since 243). Might polygeny, with the exonerating biblical exclusion it
offered, have been a message that a southern plantation owner would have welcomed?
How many plantation owners, "wanting to believe," would have questioned its veracity?
Or would they simply have accepted it as they would the Sermon on the Mount? Why
question a scientist, who by definition is much better equipped to "know"?
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Gould decries the sometimes sinister homeostatic role that such ostensibly credible
contentions have played repeatedly throughout the history of science in bolstering ideological support for oppressive social systems. Gould responds sharply to Agassiz's antiegalitarian rhetoric (which resurfaces perennially in determinist writing):
Similar arguments, carrying the apparent sanction of science, have been
continually invoked in attempts to equate egalitarianism with sentimental hope
and emotional blindness. People who are unaware of this historical pattern tend
to accept each recurrence at face value: that is, they assume that each statement
arises from the "data" actually presented, rather than from the social conditions
that truly inspire it. (Gould, Ever Since 243)
As a scientist, writer, and historian of science, Gould is keenly aware of the misconceptions to which the lay audience is vulnerable. In "hard" sciences such as chemistry
and physics, a well-written lab report can be almost as informative as seeing a phenomenon with one's own eyes in the laboratory. This is not so in the less palpable realm of
racial comparisons, however, where the "conclusion" may well have been written before
the experiment was even conducted—as seems to have been the case with Cyril Burt's
twin studies (Dorfman). Gould asserts that all nineteenth-century polygeny and physical
measurement theories supporting racial differences—however prominent their proponents—have since been discredited.
The most notorious application of biological determinism to social policy, of
course, occurred throughout the German Holocaust of the 1930s and 1940s. Gould,
Kenneth Burke, and the North Carolina State University language scholar Steven Katz
provide an interesting triangulation upon the rhetorical mechanisms that helped to
organize Nazi bureaucracy into a monolithic killing machine. In "The Most Unkindest
Cut of All" in Dinosaur in a Haystack (1995), Gould discusses the German Wannsee
Protocol of 1942—the high-level government conference at which plans for the "Final
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Solution" (eradicating Jews from German-held nations) were solidified. Gould explores
what he sees as Adolf Hitler's utter misappropriation of Darwinian theory, "the distortion
of a statement about differential reproductive success into a bogus validation of mass
murder as natural" (316).
The technical details of just how to classify people as "sufficiently Jewish" to
warrant expulsion or death were hashed out at the Wannsee conference. Half-breeds
(humans having one Aryan and one Jewish parent) and full-breed Jews were to receive an
expulsion or death sentence, with exemptions being available only for half-breeds who
had reproduced with full-blooded Aryan mates. Such exemptions required high level
approval, as well as submission to sterilization. A quarter-breed was exempted, but
authorities could rescind his or her exemption for reasons as ludicrous as having a general
appearance that was "racially particularly objectionable so that he already outwardly
must be included among the Jews" (314). Gould asks, "What can be more insane than
madness that constructs its own byzantine taxonomy—or are we just witnessing the
orderly mind of the petty bureaucrat applied to human lives rather than office files?"
(314).
In Mein Kampf(1925, 1927), Adolf Hitler harnessed what Gould describes as an
incomplete understanding of Darwinian theory to urge an inevitable and biologically
preordained triumph of the strong over the weak. The idea was that helping the weak
went against the iron logic of nature and was detrimental to the strong. Invoking the
"good of the species," Hitler wrote:
In the struggle for daily bread all those who are weak and sickly or less determined
succumb. . . . And struggle is always a means for improving a species' health and
power of resistance and, therefore, a cause of its higher development. . . . For, since
the inferior always predominates numerically over the best, if both had the same
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possibility of preserving life and propagating, the inferior would multiply so
much more rapidly that in the end the best would inevitably be driven into the
background, unless a correction of this state of affairs were undertaken. Nature
does just this by subjecting the weaker part to such severe living conditions that by
them alone the number is limited, and by not permitting the remainder to increase
promiscuously, but making a new and ruthless choice according to strength and
health. (284-286)
It is easy to imagine how this skillful (though longwinded) invocation of an ostensibly
ineluctable mystery of nature might have helped Adolf Eichmann to rationalize
dispassionately the "difficult living conditions, then kill the survivors" approach of his
Jewish master plan.
Gould labels such thinking a misinterpretation of evolutionary theory by quoting
Darwin from Origin of Species: ". . . I use the term Struggle for Existence in a large and
metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and including (which
is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny. . . .
A plant on the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against a drought" (qtd. in
Dinosaur 316). Gould believes that the role of competition in species survival, though
undeniable, was overemphasized in popular opinion during periods of aggressive
expansion and conquest. To Gould, the role of cooperation has been under-emphasized
or ignored.
In "The Ethic of Expediency: Classical Rhetoric, Technology, and the Holocaust,"
Steven Katz analyzed a 1942 German technical document proposing structural
modifications to gas vans used to "process" Jews by carbon monoxide asphyxiation.
A Mr. Just, the writer of the memo, makes the following recommendations to his
supervisor, Walter Rauff:
•

He advises that the volume of the vans must be decreased to improve vehicle
stability and to improve efficiency by requiring less carbon monoxide to
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displace the contained air: "If the load space is reduced, and the vehicle is
packed solid, the operating time can be considerably shortened" (qtd. in Katz
255).
•

He suggests that improved lighting is necessary because "the load" has a
tendency to press hard against the doors in unlighted vans, following the
external light. "Also, because of the alarming nature of darkness, screaming
always occurs when the doors are closed. It would therefore be useful to light
the lamp before and during the first moments of the operation" (qtd. in Katz
256).

•

For easier cleaning, Just advises that a floor drain be installed in each van.

The memo refers only to the "load," the "merchandise," and the number of "pieces to be
processed." It never uses terms that might remind the reader of the humanity of those for
upon whom the vans were to operate. To Katz, and I am sure to Gould as well, the
anesthetizingly rhetorical power implicit in this document's coldly objective ethos is just
as appalling as the process it was supporting. To me, Henry Goddard's ideally efficient
society and Richard Herrnstein's driving meritocracy of the cognitive elite embody—
certainly not in degree, but in kind

this same, coldly objective frame of mind.

The rhetorician Kenneth Burke shares Katz's indignation at the subtle ability of
impersonal technical language to legitimize genocide in Nazi Germany: "The history of
the Nazis has clearly shown that there are cultural situations in which scientists, whatever
may be their claims to professional austerity, will contrive somehow to identify their
specialty with modes of justification, or socialization, not discernible in the sheer motions
of the material operations themselves" (Burke 32). This describes well the coldly
efficient utilitarianism so obvious in Just's letter to Rauff. Just is a methodical,
detail-oriented technical worker, trying conscientiously to improve the process at hand, to
further the progress of his organization and himself, and to identify himself seamlessly
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with dominant power. Burke comments as well on the sense of mystery shared by both
science and deity:
In its transcendence of natural living, its technical scruples, its special tests of
purity, a clinic or laboratory can be a kind of secular temple, in which ritualistic
devotions are taking place, however concealed by the terminology of the surface.
Unless properly scrutinized for traces of witchcraft, these could furtively become
devotions to a satanic order of motives. At least such was the case with the
technological experts of Hitlerite Germany (32).
Burke is describing a technology garbed in a persuasive air of mystery. By virtue of its
general incomprehensibility to the average person, science may paradoxically intensify
its persuasive power over those conditioned to awe its mystique.
To Gould, scientists bear rightful responsibility only for confirming or refuting
facts, and for informing ethical thought—not for executing moral / ethical decisions.
Ethical decisions to him are outside the scientific realm, subject only to our own individual sense of humanity and empathy. "Science can supply information as input to a
moral decision," Gould states, "but the ethical realm of 'oughts' cannot be logically
specified by the factual 'is' of the natural world—the only aspect of reality that science
can adjudicate" (Dinosaur 318). Gould sees important limits to the authority of science,
limits that in his view have often been transgressed to provide rhetorical ammunition for
the perpetuation of social injustices like the Holocaust.
The overt and scientifically rationalized racial hatred of the Nazi era has been
universally denounced, with the affirmation, "never again," being widely heard. No
atrocity on its scale has occurred since, although recent events in Rwanda, Serbia, and
East Timor evoke great concern. It is clear from these events that the building blocks of
racial hatred have not been forever dismantled. How can such building blocks remain

49
stockpiled at the close of the twentieth century? Perhaps one perpetuator is the ideology
of biological determinism, subtly embedded within public policy debate.
Herrnstein and Murray's 1994 book, The Bell Curve, offers a more contemporary
example of the brand of biological determinist argument to which Gould is so mightily
opposed. Two key points of the book are that group IQ differences correlate well with
differences in social status, law abidingness, illegitimacy, morality, and civic-mindedness; and that Blacks—who have demonstrated a lower average IQ—are correspondingly
less well endowed with these attributes. Another point is that past inequities in societal
structures have today been superceded by a color-blind meritocracy based only on intelligence differences, with all people now being free to assume their place in a hierarchy
based increasingly on (primarily innate) intellectual merit.
Herrnstein and Murray present their case in an easy-to-read, "We're just telling
you the facts" style. "Much as some observers wished it were not true," they write,
"there is often a need to assess differences between people as objectively, fairly, and
efficiently as possible, and even the early mental tests often did a better job Of it than any
of the alternatives" (6). The book relies heavily upon statistical analyses performed by
the authors upon data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). This
survey tracked a wide variety of educational, occupational, and social variables for over
ten thousand American youth who were between the ages of fourteen and twenty-two
when the ongoing survey began in 1979. The authors performed their analyses on data
that had accumulated up to the early 1990s.
Herrnstein and Murray portray American society at the close of the twentieth
century as a society undergoing an unprecedented stratification into classes of differing
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intellectual capacities. Although they attempt to associate many social ills such as out-ofwedlock births, unemployment, and even health problems with group intelligence
deficits, Herrnstein and Murray believe that cognitive stratification does offer benefits:
Chief among them is the triumph of an American ideal. Americans believe that
each person should be able to go as far as talent and hard work will take him, and
much of what we have described is the realization of that conviction, for people
with high IQs. The breadth of the change was made possible by twentieth-century
technology, which expanded the need for people with high IQs by orders of
magnitude. But the process itself has been a classic example of people free to
respond to opportunity and of an economic system that created opportunities in
abundance. (511)
But above all, the picture Herrnstein and Murray paint is one of fear

fear within the

"cognitive elite" that the less intelligent are becoming more and more dangerous to live
around, and fear among the less intelligent that a new type of conservatism is burgeoning
in America, a conservatism that is "along Latin American lines, where to be conservative
has often meant doing what is necessary to preserve the mansions on the hills from the
menace of the slums below" (518).
At eight hundred pages, with over 250 pages of appendices, notes, and bibliographies, the book is ostensibly well-researched and documented. From a rhetorical
standpoint, however—beneath the abundant citations, cross references, correlation
charts, and linear regression analyses—there appears a permeating lilt of what Harvard
psychologist, Howard Gardner, calls "scholarly brinkmanship":
Whether concerning an issue of science, policy, or rhetoric, the authors come
dangerously close to embracing the most extreme positions, yet in the end shy
away from doing so. Discussing scientific work on intelligence, they never quite
say that intelligence is all-important and tied to one's genes; yet they signal that
this is their belief and that readers ought to embrace the same conclusions.
Discussing policy, they never quite say that affirmative action should be totally
abandoned or that childbearing or immigration by those with low IQ's should be
curbed; yet they signal their sympathy for these options and intimate that readers
ought to consider these possibilities. Finally, the rhetoric of the book encourages
readers to identify with the IQ elite, and to distance themselves from the
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dispossessed in what amounts to an invitation to class warfare. Scholarly
brinkmanship encourages the reader to draw the strongest conclusions, while
allowing the authors to disavow this intention. (Gardner 63-64)
So, in addition to what Gould and others see as questionable statistical data, Gardner
perceives a disingenuously manipulative rhetoric to The Bell Curve. It is exemplified by
the authors' calculated flattery towards readers arriving at page 121: "In all likelihood,
almost all of your friends and professional associates belong in that top Class I [Very
Bright] slice. Your friends and associates whom you consider to be unusually slow are
probably somewhere in Class II [Bright]" (121). In this rhetorical ploy (perhaps used in
homage to Henry Goddard), Herrnstein and Murray are clearly attempting to cultivate
identification from readers.
For its poundage alone, this eight-hundred page tome can command particular
veneration from already-sympathetic lay people unversed in statistical convention. As
will be discussed in Chapter 4, Gould contends that The Bell Curve's logical flaws are
well camouflaged amidst the ample pages, seemingly by intent. This rhetorical technique
overloads the reader with so much technical information that critical facts, possibly
misrepresented, tend to be either missed entirely by the reader, or glossed through
inattentively. Again, for many lay people the mystery of science can mean that the mere
existence of a chart, graph, statistic, or formula is enough to seal the credibility of the
thesis propounded. Scrutiny of the data is tedious at best; so much easier is it to take the
author's word for its interpretation (especially if the writer propounds favored idea).
The same snow-them-with-poundage technique has also been used by Arthur
Jensen in his eight-hundred-page work, Bias in Mental Testing (Urchin 124-144). Here,
Jensen writes this about documented Black / White IQ differences:
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Whatever the causes of the statistical differences between the test scores of various
racial groups within the United States, the preponderance of evidence leads to
the conclusion that the tests themselves do not contribute to the differences. The
observed racial group differences are real in the sense that they are not merely an
artifact of the measuring instruments. (737)
In his essay, "Jensen's Last Stand," Gould criticizes Jensen's book as being deliberately
designed to capitalize on readers' lack of statistical expertise. "Numbers have undoubted
powers to beguile and benumb," Gould writes, "but critics must probe behind numbers to
the character of arguments and the biases that motivate them" (Urchin 144). As do most
recent hereditarian works, Bias in Mental Testing presumes that intelligence has been
indisputably proven to be embodied almost entirely within a single, reified mental entity
(Spearman's "g" factor) that is measurable by linearly rankable IQ tests. Gould strongly
disputes this point, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. Jensen also documents a 15-point
average IQ difference between Black and White Americans (a difference Gould acknowledges), and devotes four hundred pages to proving that IQ tests are not "statistically
biased."
Gould describes those four hundred pages as a rhetorical red herring, preying on
reader unfamiliarity with the difference between "statistical bias" and what Gould terms
"vernacular bias." In IQ testing, statistical bias is a methodological error that would be
said to exist if a given IQ score possessed two different predictive values for two different
groups of people. For example, a given test result would be statistically biased if it
predicted one level of school grades for Blacks and another for Whites. But Gould
and his allies do not contend that IQ testing is statistically biased; they concur that the
same score generally has similar predictive value among different groups of people.
"Vernacular bias" is the bias connotation most familiar to the average layperson. It
signifies unfair advantage to or special treatment of one party—and is usually what

53
comes to mind when most lay people hear the term "bias." Gould's belief that cultural
and environmental influences play a strong role in IQ test performance does align itself
with the assertion that IQ testing is subject to vernacular bias.
Because both sides of the debate agree with the assertion that "IQ testing is not
statistically biased," Gould is appalled that Jensen devotes four hundred pages of charts,
graphs, and statistics to its support:
In short, the primary content of this book is simply irrelevant to the question that
has sparked the IQ debate and that Jensen himself treated in his 1969 article: what
does the lower average score of blacks mean? His concept of bias [statistical bias]
does not address this issue. Yet, since this issue is intimately associated with our
vernacular meaning of bias, nonstatistical reviewers (in Time and Newsweek, for
example) have been consistently confused into believing that Jensen's voluminous
data force us to reject environmental causes as the basis for group differences in IQ
scores (Urchin 131).
According to Gould, Jensen knew full well that many lay readers, scanning rather than
scrutinizing, would misread his work as a proof against vernacular bias in IQ testing.
Jensen's book seems to exemplify the rhetorical technique of "false implicature"
described by University of Minnesota rhetorician Arthur Walzer.
According to Walzer (who draws from the work of H. P. Grice), a written communication is deceptive and unethical if it violates any of four important trusts that a
reader is compelled to place in a writer. These trusts are that the information provided
possesses adequate Quantity, Quality, Relevance, and Clarity (Walzer 152-153). Gould
and Walzer would no doubt agree that Bias in Mental Testing falls shortest and is most
deceptive in regard to the Relevance requirement. Readers assume Jensen is writing
about the relevant topic of interest, vernacular bias, but he is not; he is writing about a red
herring.
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In this chapter we have explored, from Stephen Jay Gould's perspective, some
of the tangible human impacts of biological determinism in practice. We have also
examined some of the persuasive techniques employed by biological determinists to
enlist popular support. Chapter 4 will explore Gould's recurrent warning that "bad
science" provides the cornerstone of the hereditarian argument.

CHAPTER 4
EXPOSING BAD SCIENCE

Because, as the adage states, "the devil is in the details," we now turn our focus to some
of the technical foundations of determinist hypotheses. It might be said that Stephen
Jay Gould is to popular evolutionary science what Ralph Nader is to the consumer
economy—an independent evaluator who is willing to work tenaciously and against the
grain of peers for the protection of consumers. Both provoke the anger of prominent
members of society, and both claim that their goal is to leave the world a better place.
But while Nader's sirens wail against material dangers, such as the "unsafe at any speed"
Chevy Corvair, Gould aims to protect the public from something more intangible and
elusive: the misapplication of evolutionary science toward inequitable sociopolitical ends.

4.1 Scrutinizing the Cognitive Filter
Gould has described himself as a writer for the perceptive lay person and can project an
ethos of an interpreter charged with explaining the forest to one familiar only with the
trees. He seems to distrust blind allegiance in any human era or context—be it the tacit
loyalty to papal or royal authority that once shaped the Western lay person's view of
life on earth, or today's more enlightened yet nonetheless tacit trust in the importance
of dozens of scientific specialties (e.g., medicine, economics, engineering, and technologies). In observing the cultural context of apparently objective scientific ideas,
Gould seems to be attempting to raise us from the forest floor, broadening what may
have been a parochial view of human life on earth.
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Gould shows special interest in the mechanism by which the non-scientific
community's interpretation of human evolution is forged. Since neither policy-makers
nor lay people can be expected to command a scientist's breadth of knowledge, a
mediating "cognitive filter" has always been necessary to provide explanations and
interpretations of scientific theory. Gould's closest scrutiny is reserved for this
translation / application phase of the scientific communication process, and it is here
—in the interstices of popularization itself

that he searches for "forest and the trees"

type bias. By this I refer to the rhetorical frame of reference that can clothe ostensibly
objective popular translations of evolutionary theory. Later in this chapter, for example,
we will examine Gould's assertion that Darwin's original theories were rhetorically metamorphosed for popular and political consumption.
Gould is sensitive not only to those cognitive filters that he believes misrepresent
valid science, but also to those which mask breaches in scientific integrity and incursions
of science into realms he considers beyond its purview—ethics and morality. What then
is Gould's definition of "good" science? It is a science free from inappropriate metaphors and untestable conjecture, a science in which fruitful dissent is encouraged, and
life's ultimate questions (such as the nature of life, the origin of the universe, the
beginning of time, etc.) are recognized as beyond testability. As an ardent opponent of
creationism, Gould asserts this last prerequisite loudly: ". . . 'creation science'—as an
untestable set of dogmatic proposals—could not qualify as science by any standard
definition (Bully 456)." To Gould, we must not vilify scientists for failing to supply
answers to ultimate type questions because only demagogues would pretend to.
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As an example of the fruitful dissent that Gould views as characteristic of the
beauty of science, he cites three alternate theories propounded for the extinction of
dinosaurs. The first was that planetary warming caused dinosaur testes to malfunction.
The second theory posited that angiosperms (flowering plants), which began to evolve
toward the end of the dinosaur era, might have produced addictive psychoactive toxins
that dinosaurs were unable to detoxify metabolically—thus poisoning the dinosaurs into
extinction. The third theory, now widely accepted, was Luis and Walter Alvarez's
contention that a comet or asteroid collided with the earth and caused a global darkness
with fatal consequences for dinosaurs.
According to Gould, the Alvarez theory has survived because it was testable and
spawned hundreds of studies intended to confirm or refute its feasibility (Flamingo 425).
In the most widely known studies, iridium
comets and meteors

an element rare on earth but abundant in

was found to be abundant throughout the earth specifically at the

geological stratum associated with the demise of dinosaurs. Inherently untestable, neither
the Planetary Warming nor the Toxic Angiosperm theory generated tangible confirmatory
research, and to Gould both must be discarded as unprovable conjecture. As for the
Alvarez theory, evidence currently supports it, but as with all "good science," it will
always be open to revision should future data prove contradictory.
Though acknowledging the importance of metaphor in the creative mechanism of
scientific discovery (e.g., the discovery of DNA first required the conceptualized metaphor of "sequentially coded assembly instructions"), Gould believes that metaphors have
often been misapplied in the dissemination of scientific knowledge. He is an ardent critic
of some translational metaphors historically used to convey evolutionary theory to non-
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scientific audiences, particularly those theories that might be described as lingering
vestiges of the Platonic tradition. A key Platonic tenet was belief in the existence of a
single, overarching "Natural Law" to which all life has been and will continue to be
subservient. As derivatives of this tradition, Gould cites the following "bad habits of
Western Thought":
Atomism—The assumption that after dissection of a physical or conceptual
"whole" into parts, inferences made from the parts about the whole are always
valid.
Reductionism—The simplification of complex phenomena into more easily
interpretable principles.
Determinism The idea that all events have a definite, predictable, and
determinable causes.
To Gould, metaphors can deceive as well as teach. For instance, the reductionist "ladder
of gradual progress" from amoeba to fish to amphibian to mammal to Homo sapiens
discussed in Chapter 2 is to Gould a gross misrepresentation of evolution.
Gould's reading of Darwin, the fossil record, and his own research culminating
in the theory of punctuated equilibrium have convinced him that species evolve not
gradually but in sudden geological bursts through a complex "bush" of ancestral lineages
(most branches of which have died out long before our time). He sees the utilitarian
"urge to progress" as the necessitating rationale for society's persistent clinging to
comforting notions of gradual, unilinear evolution culminating in our own species. And,
as we have explored, the perception of a directed, unilinear evolution to "higher races"
has been a powerful and effective (mis)guiding rationale for slavery, imperialism, and
Hitlerian atrocity.
A related element of this "progress-colored" cognitive filter, according to Gould,
has been an over-reliance upon "essentialism" or "reification"—the abstraction of
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ostensibly sharply defined mental constructs from more subtle and ambiguous shadings
of natural reality. "Ever since Plato . . . essentialism has dominated Western thought
[and] encouraged us to neglect continua and to divide reality into a set of correct and
unchanging categories" (Flamingo 161). Indeed, Gould believes that essentialism often
ignores individual uniqueness and results in unwarranted pigeon-holing of humans,
insects, or whatever species is being studied. Reification invites quantification,
measurement, comparison, and ranking of relative worth based on group membership.
To Gould, reification has had its most insidious impact in the realm of intelligence
testing, where measurement and ranking of a hypothesized, reified "g" factor has become
the linchpin of twentieth-century biological determinist argument.
To Gould it is variation among individuals, not abstracted essences of "central
tendency," that is the key to understanding physical reality and Darwinian evolution.
He is skeptical of the power of statistics to adequately represent the nature of this
individual variation, offering as an example the socioeconomic application of statistical
means and modes to population income distribution. A reported gain in "mean income"
might not represent an income gain for a large proportion of the population; it could be
due largely to the highly weighted income gains of the minority in the very highest
income levels. On the other hand, the rarely reported statistical "mode," which represents
the most common income within a population, could be considered a truer representation
of the overall population's income level. "Measures of central tendency differ in highly
skewed distributions [such as those representing income distribution in Capitalist
countries]—and a major source of employment for economic and political "spin doctors"
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lies in knowing which measure to choose as the best propaganda for the honchos who
hired your gun" (Full House 54).
Preferring the term "cultural change" to "cultural evolution," Gould argues that
cultural advance throughout history has been a function of additive learning rather than
biological Darwinian processes. "The common designation of 'evolution' then leads to
one of the most frequent and portentous errors in our analysis of human life and history—
the overly reductionist assumption that the Darwinist natural paradigm will fully
encompass our social and technological history as well" (Full House 219).
Jean Baptiste Lamarck was an early nineteenth-century evolutionary theorist who
believed that acquired traits were transmissible by inheritance to progeny. Although the
Lamarckian theory of biological evolution was superceded by Darwin's idea that natural
selection acts upon undirected individual variation, Gould is quick to promote "cultural
Lamarckianism" as the driving force of cultural change. "Lamarckian evolution is rapid
and accumulative. It explains the cardinal difference between our past, purely biological
mode of change and our current, maddening acceleration toward something new and
liberating

or toward an abyss" (Panda 84). I am reminded of Steven Katz's description

of the "ethic of expediency" in Nazi Germany. To him the Nazi juggernaut was ideologically fueled by the hypnotic mass delusion that Aryan biological superiority and
cultural preeminence were not only manifest, but intimately entwined.
Although it is comforting to believe that the advance of civilization from the Stone
Age to the Space Age was enabled by concurrent physical evolutionary changes in our
species, Gould states that he has seen no evidence that either the human body or mind has
changed functionally within the last 100,000 years (Full House 219). It is somehow

61
humbling for us to conceive that, with proper training, a Cro-Magnon human would have
been capable of intellectual endeavors that we twentieth-century humans often assume to
exist solely within our own domain (e.g., art, mathematics, and science).

4.2 How to Misunderstand Darwin
Claptrap and bogus Darwinian formulations have been used to justify every form
of social exploitation—rich over poor, technologically complex over traditional,
imperialist over aborigine, conqueror over defeated in war. Every evolutionist
knows this history only too well, and we bear some measure of collective
responsibility for the uncritical fascination that many of us have shown for such
unjustified extension. But most false expropriations of our chief phrase [natural
selection] have been undertaken without our knowledge and against our will.
Stephen Jay Gould (Dinosaur 315)

Darwin's The Origin of Species (1859) reverberated widely in the field of social reform.
Reformers contended that Christian morality and fairness, which had figured strongly
in the formation of Western civilization's social and legal systems, must now be
superceded by the impartial and sometimes unpalatable objectivity of evolutionary
biology. "Proposals for change might shock traditional ethics," Gould explains, "but if
they brought social procedure into harmony with human biology, we might establish a
beginning of a rational and scientific order freed from ancient superstition and therefore,
in the long run, humane in the literal sense" (Ontogeny 120). It is Gould's contention,
however, that extrapolations of Darwinian theory onto the societal plain represent
unwarranted extrapolations from Darwin's original work and intentions.
Britain's Herbert Spencer wrote widely on evolution, science, and philosophy, and
spearheaded the first application of evolutionary theory to the social milieu. He, not
Darwin, coined the phrase "survival of the fittest" ("Spencer" and "Survival," Minerva).
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Although Spencer used Darwin's work in forming his own theories (some of which have
come to be known, mostly pejoratively, as "social Darwinism") he is credited with
conceptualizing the evolutionary importance of the "struggle for survival" independently
of Darwin.
In Spencer's view, immutable natural law dictates that the survival and economic
success of individuals in society are limited to only the fittest members of that society,
with the less fit relegated deservedly to inferior social status and living conditions. And
because Natural Law was the moving agent, it would be fruitless, wasteful, and counterproductive to endeavor to improve the social fortunes of these lower classes. Social
Darwinist ideology reputedly resonated well within laissez faire economic attitudes
among the Victorian upper classes.
Gould has taken it upon himself to scrutinize the cultural context of Darwinian
theory's exegesis. He states that evolutionary theory did not just arise out of thin air in
some sort of "Eureka!" epiphany for Darwin, nor did it arise solely from pure observations of Baconian inductivism. It was a combination of both, plus the impact of
Darwin's upper class background (which secured him his post on the H.M.S. Beagle
and boosted his professional credibility) and his familiarity with the work of political
economists Thomas Malthus and Adam Smith.
Malthus observed the logarithmic mode of population growth and the tendency
of organisms to produce more offspring than can survive on existing food supplies. To
Malthus this resulted in famines and epidemics as natural outcomes and could be checked
only through the control of population. Darwin (and his co-discoverer of evolution,
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Alfred Russel Wallace) read Malthus and extended his theory to include a natural
selection of the better adapted among organisms competing for survival.
Also indispensable to Darwin was Adam Smith's laissez faire theory of economics.
In it, Smith propounded that individuals, working diligently to advance their own
economic self interest, ultimately ensure the stability and good of the greater society.
Gould describes Smith's concept:
The essence of Smith's argument is a paradox of sorts: If you want an ordered
economy providing maximal benefits to all, then let individuals compete and
struggle for their own advantage. The result, after appropriate sorting and
elimination of the inefficient, will be a stable and harmonious polity. Apparent
order arises naturally from the struggle among individuals, not from the predestined
principles of higher control. (Panda 66)
Gould accepts Darwin's extraction of biological theory from economic theory. In fact,
he seems to consider the biological version more valid than its economic progenitor: "It
seems ironic that Adam Smith's system of laissez faire does not work in his own domain
of economics, for it leads to oligopoly and revolution rather than to order and harmony"
(Panda 68).
Gould targets as particularly fallacious the determinist framing of evolution
promoted by Herbert Spencer. Spencer saw evolution as a unidirectional progression
through history, culminating in the uber-species of Homo sapiens sapiens and, by
implication, uber

and unter

subgroups within our species. In his book, Social Statics,

or the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness (1851), Spencer wrote:
Humanity must in the end become completely adapted to its conditions. . . .
Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead of civilization
being artificial, it is a part of nature; all of a piece with the development of the
embryo or the unfolding of a flower. The modifications mankind have undergone,
and are still undergoing, result from a law underlying the whole organic creation;
and provided the human race continues, and the constitution of things remains the
same, those modifications must end in completeness. (65)
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To Gould this notion nurtures wall!!, frizzy "for the good of the species" rationalizations
that misread Darwin's more individualistic theories. "Darwin's mechanism works
through the differential reproductive success of individuals who, by fortuitous possession
of features rendering them more successful in changing local environments, leave more
offspring" (Dinosaur 329).
Gould interprets Darwin's perception of "the greater good of the species" as being
an analog to Adam Smith's perception that individual gain only indirectly benefits the
entire group, as a secondary after-effect. Smith's statement that "all direct causality lies
in the struggle among individuals" applied from Darwin's perspective as well, according
to Gould (qtd. in Dinosaur 329). It is more difficult to be proud of one's group's
"superior" qualities when the individual's possession of those qualities is acknowledged
as accidental rather than pre-ordained by group membership.
As for unilinearity, Gould's essays frequently remind us that the fossil record
(especially fossils found in zones such as Canada's Burgess Shale region) consistently
supports the hypothesis that evolution has not been a "ladder" or "straight line." It has
been, rather, a series of bush-like branchings and sub-branchings, many occurring
concurrently in geological time, with contemporary species such as Homo sapiens
representing merely the surviving twigs on more fully foliated ancestral branches that
have now gone almost completely extinct. Gould's evolution is not a linear and
progressive "path," but a fractal and contingent "bush."
Attendant with the idea of evolutionary progress is the corollary concept of
unilinear ranking and worth. In his personal writings, Darwin frequently reminded
himself to eschew the notion of "higher and lower" animals (Ever Since 36). He viewed

65
the amoeba's ability to adapt to its environment, for example, as no less notable than the
human being's ability to adapt to its own. Darwin wrote in The Descent of Man (1871)
that his theories of evolution
have given to man a pedigree of prodigious length, but not, it may be said, of noble
quality. The world, it has often been remarked, appears as if it had long been
preparing for the advent of man: and this, in one senses strictly true, for he owes his
birth to a long line of progenitors. If any single link in this chain had never existed,
man would not have been exactly what he now is. Unless we wilfully close our
eyes, we may, with our present knowledge, approximately recognise our parentage;
nor need we feel ashamed of it. The most humble organism is something much
higher than the inorganic dust under our feet; and no one with an unbiassed mind
can study any living creature, however humble, without being struck with
enthusiasm at its marvellous structure and properties. (165)
Gould states that Darwin even preferred the phrase "descent with modification" over
"evolution" because the latter term possessed connotations of progress (and its attendant
comparative ranking between and within species). Gould cites our predilection for
ranking human groups according to presumed evolutionary attainment, which, he says,
"remains a primary component of our global arrogance, our belief in dominion over
rather than fellowship with, more than a million other species that inhabit our planet"
(Ever Since 37).
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the discipline of "sociobiology" has
become an important torch-bearer for biological determinism. Its chief proponent has
been Edward 0. Wilson, Gould's colleague at the Harvard Museum of Comparative
Zoology. His 1975 work, Sociobiology, impressed Gould for its extensive treatment of
animal social behavior, but not for its closing chapter on the development of human
social traits. The core tenet of sociobiology is the contention that virtually all human
social behavior—be it aggression, spite, deception, xenophobia, conformity, gender-
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specific social behavior, homosexuality, and even altruism—is determined by genetic
influences:
The hypothalamic-limbic complex of a highly social species, such as man,
"knows," or more precisely it has been programmed to perform as if it knows,
that its underlying genes will be proliferated maximally only if it orchestrates
behavioral responses that bring into play an efficient mixture of personal survival,
reproduction, and altruism. Consequently, the centers of the complex tax the
conscious mind with ambivalences whenever the organisms encounter stressful
situations. Love joins hate; aggression, fear; expansiveness, withdrawal; and so on;
in blends designed not to promote the happiness and survival of the individual, but
to favor the maximum transmission of the controlling genes. (4)
Development and persistence of behaviors through history, according to the theory,
depend largely upon their adaptive or maladaptive character. Since adaptive behaviors
allow an individual's genes to survive, sociobiology argues, the capacity to execute
adaptive social behaviors may be largely inherited.
Gould sees in sociobiology another tool to help rationalize oppressive social
systems. In an article in The New York Times Magazine on October 12, 1975, Wilson
attributed gender-based social differences to genetic determinants:
In hunter-gatherer societies, men hunt and women stay at home. This strong bias
persists in most agricultural and industrial societies and, on that ground alone,
appears to have a genetic origin... . My own guess is that the genetic bias is
intense enough to cause a substantial division of labor even in the most free and
most egalitarian societies. . . . Even with identical education and equal access to all
professions, men are likely to continue to play a disproportionate role in political
life, business and science. (qtd. in Gould, Urchin 29)
In Gould's view, such sociobiological claims fall apart when one perceives, embedded
within them, the a priori assumptions that 1) the trait in question was genetically determined, and 2) the trait was "naturally selected" for its adaptive value. Again, Gould
sounds the penalty buzzer against "thumb-on-the-scale" science casting the social status
quo as proper, adaptive, inevitable, and unchangeable—and therefore a definite waste of
energy to attempt to change. To Gould, Wilson uses a "cart before the horse" logic
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(analogous to that found in Paul Broca's brain weight studies) in assuming his own
hypothesis was correct before adequate proof had been demonstrated.
To Gould, Sociobiology's persistent application of Darwinian adaptationism to
the historical development of human behavior is not good science, but rather an elaborate
and unsupported metaphorical extrapolation

a "cardboard Darwinism." Gould's key

criticism of sociobiology is that it ignores non-genetic means of cultural transmission.
Believing that cultural change is often mistaken for biological evolution, Gould
frequently reiterates in his essays that little evidence exists for the human brain having
evolved any functional improvement over the last 100,000 years (re-enter our CroMagnon, perhaps doing calculus or successfully programming a video cassette recorder).
In criticizing the ideas of sociobiology, Gould forwards his own favored belief in
biological potentialism: He contends that although genetic influences are indeed very
important factors in human behavior and social systems, it is a combination of culture,
the environment, and the Lamarckian accumulation of learning—all acting upon a
biologically determined substrate of human potential

that ultimately shapes individual

and societal behaviors. Gould decries our search for distinct "Nature vs. Nurture"
categorizations, which to him are illusory oversimplifications of a complex interrelationship. As phraseology more representative of this complexity, he prefers the terms
"Determinism" and "Potentialism": "The statement that humans are animals does not
imply that our specific patterns of behaviors and social arrangements are in any way
directly determined by our genes. Potentiality and determination are different concepts"
(Ever Since 251).
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Human consciousness, a function of the brain's functional complexity, is at the
heart of the issue. Whereas sociobiology might assert that social norms and institutions
are a direct result of naturally selected, genetically inherited neuro-hoimonal functions,
Gould views the cultural consequences of our large brains as secondary and incidental
side-benefits of biological capabilities much more directly and practically linked to
human survival (such as the cognitive and physiological endowments needed for
improved hunting and evasion skills, or for the ability to act cooperatively). To Gould
the neurological, anatomical, and physiological complexity necessary to effect these
critical skills could also have permitted "side-effect" or "co-opted epiphenomenal"
behavior to arise—behavior that can be irrelevant or even detrimental to species
adaptation and survival.
For example, one could argue that the more undesirable manifestations of human
aggression are merely side-effects of the vitally important "fight or flight" neurohormonal response that evolved earlier in our evolutionary past and protected our species
from legitimate and formidable predators. Although contemporary human life is in no
way free from predatory dangers demanding aggressive responses, the newspaper can
usually be counted on to provide daily examples of destructive aggression (often in the
form of murder, spousal abuse, road rage, or other antisocial behavior). While in the heat
of the moment such behavior may seem "only natural" to its perpetrators, few would
argue that such behavior is at all adaptive toward the perpetuation of our species.
The Achilles' heel of sociobiology, according to Gould, is the fact that a true proof
of its tenets is logistically impossible: The "experiment" necessary to prove genetic
causation of social traits would involve multigenerational studies controlling for both
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breeding and environment. And since we are a slow-breeding species not generally
amenable to the vocation of lab rat, the supporting evidence for sociobiological theory
is sparse, in Gould's view. Even if it were true that social skills and institutions are
genetically determined, Gould uses the analogy of corrective eyeglasses to counter the
contention that the consequences of one's "social genes" are unimprovable. If eyeglasses
can correct an inherited vision defect (as they do for millions), why should it be fruitless
to consider mass efforts to improve even "genetically inferior" social capacities.
One sociobiological concept that Gould finds both intriguing and plausible is the
idea of adaptive altruism. Darwin considered both "Gladiator" and "Altruist" perspectives in his view of animal evolution. However, the Gladiator theory, promulgated by
Darwin's ardent disciple, Thomas Henry Huxley, was much more widely disseminated
and accepted. It interpreted "survival of the fittest" from a decidedly amoral perspective
that emphasized constant struggle and belligerent combat among individuals and groups,
and having the goal of gaining reproductive advantage through transmission of genes to
the next generation.
The Altruism theory posited that reproductive advantage might, at least on some
occasions, issue from mutual aid and cooperative behavior among individuals. For
example, if an individual animal gives its life in a mismatched confrontation that
nonetheless succeeds in allowing that individual's kin to flee and survive, then a quantifiable percentage of the victim's genes will live on in the surviving kin. Gould suggests
that, of the two theories, the Gladiator theory has garnered more support chiefly because
it extrapolates more synergistically onto Adam Smith's laissez faire capitalist economic
system. According to Gould, Darwin intended the term "struggle" in a metaphorical
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sense, sometimes meaning physical combat and sometimes meaning cooperation.
Darwin's first "struggle for existence" reference was to the plight of a
plant in harsh, arid growing conditions.
In summary, Gould opposes sociobiology for what he sees as its tacit and
unprovable assumption that prevalent social behavior has become prevalent by virtue of
genetic transmission and environment-driven natural selection. In its claims that the
origins of human thought and behavior are largely inherited, sociobiology denies due
consideration of the influence of learning and culture on behavior. Yet Gould does not
deny that biology bears an important influence upon behavior and culture:
I am supposed to be a "nurturist" in the great "nature-nurture" debate, but I find
nothing upsetting in this notion of biological influence upon human behavior.
Every scientist, indeed every intelligent person knows that human social behavior
is a complex and indivisible mix of biological and social influences. The issue is
not whether nature or nurture determines human behavior, for these factors are
truly inextricable, but the degree, intensity, and nature of the constraint exerted by
biology upon the possible forms of social organization. (Urchin 112-113)
Gould demonstrates an admirable ability to admit points of concurrence with the arguments of his rhetorical opponents, eschewing absolute rhetorical dichotomies and oversimplifications. To Gould, nature is above all a flexible and wonderfully complex
phenomenon: "I rejoice in the multifariousness of nature and leave the chimera of
certainty to politicians and preachers" (Ever Since 271).
As always, Gould's sensitive nose for the a priori conclusion makes him wary of
oversimplification: "To substitute biology for history in the absence of evidence requires
an a priori faith that genetic explanations are, in some ultimate sense, preferable" (Urchin
118). This preference Gould attributes to Wilson's "old fashioned reductionism,"
a mind-frame engendered by Wilson's awareness that "hard science" can afford more
credibility to his field than can history. Just as he did with Robert Yerkes, the Harvard
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psychologist who struggled hard with the "Army IQ Test" to bolster scientific credibility
for the "soft science" of psychology, Gould ascribes a sort of "science envy" to Wilson
(Urchin 118). Wilson's strict adaptationist perspective dismisses with presumed scientific objectivity Gould's more flexible view of the social / biological interrelationship.
Darwin undeniably recognized the role of amoral physical violence in the
struggle of individuals to survive, but Gould insists that Darwin specifically avoided the
extrapolation of this phenomenon into the societal plain. Gould cites the following as his
favorite moral statement by Darwin: "If the misery of the poor be caused not by the laws
of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin" (qtd. in Dinosaur 62).

4.3 Fighting "Science" with Science
By most practitioners' definition (including Gould's), a shining attribute of robust,
well-executed science is its openness to disproof by new data. But how can Gould
reconcile such a deference to objectivity with his assertion that science is influenced by
the sociocultural assumptions of its practitioners? Gould describes scientific breakthroughs as being neither the exclusive product of ivory tower Baconian Logical
Positivism (inductive inference made exclusively from observable facts) nor the
exclusive product of "Eureka! moments" of intuitive, learning-dependent, and culturally
conditioned personal epiphany.
Instead, he recognizes both these influences upon the "context of discovery," the
creative realm within which important scientific ideas originate. But while the context of
discovery permits both personal bias and objective observation to percolate unimpeded,
Gould asserts that the validation phase of the scientific process, the "context of
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justification," must shed its subjectivity and rely upon objective, agreed-upon standards
of proof.
Gould believes that, in the name of scientific honesty, scientists must acknowledge
their own prejudices openly rather than obscure them:
We scientists are no different from anyone else. We are passionate human beings,
enmeshed in a web of personal and social circumstances. Our field does recognize
canons of procedure designed to give nature the long shot of asserting herself in the
face of such biases, but unless scientists understand their hopes and engage in
vigorous self-scrutiny, they will not be able to sort unacknowledged preference
from nature's weak and imperfect message. (Urchin 150)
To Gould, the cultural context of scientific discovery is something to acknowledge and
even embrace; the danger lay in its concealment. It is with this in mind that Gould
revisits the work of biological determinist scientists—combing their data, notes, and
conclusions for indications of concealed subjective bias.
As mentioned earlier, Gould applied just such scrutiny to the work of nineteenthcentury Philadelphia physician and polygenist, Samuel Morton. Morton, again, had
attempted to prove that skull capacity was linearly rankable according to race, with White
European races ranking highest and Native Americans and Negroes ranking lowest.
Gould actually obtained access to Morton's skull collection, and measured Morton's
skulls' volumes for himself. Gould's data clearly exposed Morton's method and
conclusions as the decidedly unscientific product of Morton's a priori conclusion about
what the final ranking order must be ("Morton's Ranking").
Paul Broca's conclusions regarding brain size and weight measurements also
described a unilinear ranking system for sexes and races. Again, Gould uses as his chief
debunking tool the demonstration that a priori bias had penetrated into the researcher's
context of justification. As described earlier, this penetration was patently evident in
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Broca's circular reasoning—his confusion of his own hypothesis with indisputable fact.
He also failed to normalize for the body size, age, weight, sex, and health status of the
individuals whose brains he measured.
Darwinism laid the foundation for recapitulationism, the theory that the human
development cycle reenacts the path of evolution from ancestral species. Recapitulationists like Ernst Haeckel, Carl Voigt, Louis Agassiz, Cesare Lombroso, and Herbert
Spencer believed that different races (again, race, the fulcrum of biological determinism)
represented different levels of advancement along a unilinear continuum culminating in
White northeastern European males. While considering their argument discreditable
based on its a priori premise alone, Gould is quick to write that the advance of science
itself is responsible for recapitulationism's demise, which began near the beginning of the
twentieth century.
Recall Haeckel's central theory of "terminal addition," the concept that as more and
more advanced traits were added to the end of the hypothesized human developmental
sequence, the amount of time spent by individuals reenacting the earlier phases would
"condense." Terminal addition and condensation assumed that advanced, "final stage"
traits could be appended simply—like cars on freight train

onto an existing set of traits,

and forever perpetuated thereafter. But the close of the nineteenth century brought the
rise of Mendelian genetics. Genetic characters, present at conception, were now known
to be the currency of heredity. The mechanism of genetic change, mutational substitution, had been shown as affecting any point in the developmental process—not solely the
end. Gould writes that "as long as the mechanism of heredity lay shrouded in mystery,
recapitulationists could always postulate a convenient and purely hypothetical set of laws
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[as they did in terminal addition and condensation] to yield the preferred results"
(Ontogeny 202).
As mentioned earlier, the developmental theory that supplanted recapitulation by
1909 was paedomorphism (neoteny). Again, neoteny hypothesized that the human
developmental sequence from embryo and fetus through infant and juvenile to adult
actually represents a retarding and truncating of a longer developmental sequence
followed by our ancestral species.
Rather than retreat into submission at the deflation of recapitulation, determinists
such as the Amsterdam anatomist Louis Bolk simply shifted their argument 180° to
harness the flow of the strongly prevailing new theory, neoteny. To Bolk, "lower races"
of humans had advanced too far past primate fetal form to distinguish themselves from
the "lower" species adults from which humans evolved. "Higher races" retain key traits
of primate fetuses, according to Bolk.
In Ontogeny and Phylogeny, Gould refutes as overly simplistic Bolk's argument
that modern humans (especially "higher races" of modern humans) are simply primate
fetuses that become sexually mature. True, as demonstrated in Figure 2-1, physical
similarities do exist between human adults and primate juveniles, including:
•

Flat facial shape.

•

Centrally located foramen magnum at the base of the skull
(consistent with upright rather than "all fours" posture).

•

High relative brain weight.

•

Absence of brow ridges.

•

Forward-oriented birth canal.

Gould strongly supports the central tenet of neoteny, which is that the superior function
of the human brain over the primate brain is the result of our species' period of prolonged
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infantile and juvenile dependency

an extended growth phase during which cranial

sutures and concomitant brain growth persist to an extent far beyond that seen in
primates. But Gould contends that Bolk ascribed to "higher" humans an overly simplistic
"absolute fetalization" in form, downplaying multiple subtle timing retardations that
distinguish us from primates and subordinating the action of natural selection upon
individual traits to a secondary role (Ontogeny 365). To Gould, individual human traits
probably evolved separately, not as a "package deal." Gould considers Bolk to have
produced good data, but contends that Bolk's conclusions were too imbued with raceframed philosophical baggage to afford a credible "context of justification."
As support for his (and Darwin's) contention that human vs. primate differences are
more a matter of degree than of kind, Gould cites a 1975 study by M. King and C. Wilson
comparing chimp and human polypeptides (Ontogeny 405). This protein comparison
demonstrated over 99 percent inter-species homology, adding support to Gould's favored
belief that we differ developmentally from chimps, gorillas, and other primates mainly
through the action of developmental regulation and timing genes rather than "structural
blueprint" genes. And as for genetic differences among races, he cites an analogous
study carried out by Lewontin, demonstrating negligible genetic differences between
human races (Flamingo 196).
As mentioned earlier, at the start of the twentieth century the defrocking of physical
measurement (such as Morton's craniometry) and appearance (such as Lombroso's
"stigmata") as valid criteria for racial, ethnic, and gender ranking necessitated a
redirection of biological determinist energies. The more abstract (and therefore more
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intangible, elusive, and impenetrable) field of intelligence testing became the perfect new
vehicle for determinist efforts.
Again, in Gould's view, Alfred Binet's initial humanitarian intention that
intelligence testing be used for "special educational triage" purposes was subverted by
psychologists such as Goddard, Yerkes, Brigham, and Terman, who commandeered the
concept to combat the common, pejorative perception of their discipline as a "soft
science." Central to achieving professional credibility for psychology was the identification of a discrete, measurable entity called "intelligence," an entity that—like mass,
velocity, or voltage in the "hard" sciences of physics and chemistry

could be quanti-

fiably demonstrated. But to Gould, herein lies the first of several major fallacies of
intelligence testing: the fallacy of reification.
Reification is the reductionistic attribution of concrete existence to an abstraction.
A good example of reification is embodied in the famous statue of the blindfolded figure
at the "scale of justice." How much more efficiently the criminal justice system would
operate were Justice such a physically palpable, measurable commodity. Instead, of
course, Justice is a complex, multifaceted abstraction requiring some of our society's
most highly skilled (and remunerated) professionals to navigate. To Gould and likeminded colleagues, intelligence is equally complex, equally abstract, and equally absurd
to represent as a single, palpable, and easily measurable entity. The oversimplification
that results from Western society's decision to do so has pigeonholed countless
individuals into what are often tragically and unnecessarily limiting social categories
(witness Goddard's "morons," forced sterilization, and immigration restriction law).
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Establishing credibility for intelligence as a discrete and measurable variable (and
for intelligence testing as a useful and productive contribution from the "not-so-soft-aseverybody-seems-to-think" science of psychology) would require a method of validation
readily accepted within the "hard" sciences—namely statistical mathematics. And if the
statistics to be used were sometimes too abstruse for the average lay person to comprehend, all the better: popular resistance to the theory would be minimized if the aweinspiring "mystery" of science and mathematics could be enlisted as a shield against
popular scrutiny.
The statistical framework undergirding intelligence testing is factor analysis,
a technique originally applied to mental testing in 1904 by the preeminent British
psychologist, Charles Spearman. Factor analysis is a method of quantifying the
magnitude and direction of correlation (synchronous change) among multiple variables.
Correlation is best understood by first limiting the explanation to two variables:
Consider the variables of human arm length and leg length. If arm and leg length were
measured on a group of subjects from birth through adulthood, the results would show
that these two variables increase in close synchrony throughout life. If a common
quantification method for two-variable correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient,
"r," were applied to this example, an r value approximating +1 (representing the strongest
directly proportional correlation) would be achieved. In this case the actual cause of the
correlation, the physiological process of bone growth, can be easily surmised.
By this same method, two measurements varying in opposite directions (average
winter temperature and average deaths from hypothermia, for example) would produce a
negative r value. A value of -1 would represent a perfect inverse correlation. Two
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measurements varying entirely at random (say shoe size and cholesterol level) would
show a correlation at or near zero. Real-life correlation strengths are often ambiguous, as
would be demonstrated by a correlation of 0.5 between human height and human weight.
Tall people are often heavier than average, but not always; short people are often lighter
than average, but not always.
Gould is quick to emphasize that demonstration of correlation does not
demonstrate causation. It would be a mistake to infer that increased arm length is
actually causing increased leg length (or vice versa) when both of these variables may
actually be caused by an independent factor (in this case, the human growth process) or
even multiple independent factors. The inclination to infer causation of one positively
correlated variable by another becomes even more attractive when the actual cause(s)
influencing the variables is (are) not as apparent. Gould jokes that his age and the price
of gasoline during the 1970s would have demonstrated a correlation coefficient very
close to 1.0, but it would be quite ludicrous to conclude that either of these variables had
any causative effect upon the other. The correlation coefficient is best interpreted as a
statement of the percentage of one variable's variation that may be associated with
(though not necessarily caused by) variation in another variable.
Correlation between two variables may be visually demonstrated by graphing
one variable on the X-axis and the other on the Y-axis, and then plotting one point for
each test subject's measurement pair (e.g., arm length and leg length). Correlation is then
interpreted visually by evaluating the conformity of the test group's (usually) elliptical
cluster of points to the 45° diagonal line representing perfect positive correlation.
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Figure 4-1. Correlation Between Two Variables. (Gould, Mismeasure 241)

Figure 4-2. Correlation Among Three Variables. (Gould, Mismeasure 244)
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Figure 4-1 illustrates typical cluster patterns for different correlation magnitudes of
positive correlation between two variables.
But nature is not so simple as to manifest itself only in pairs of two correlatable
variables. Scientists are often concerned with complex interrelationships involving a
larger number of variables. For three variables we can visualize three-dimensional
extensions of the scattergraphs pictured in Figure 4-1, with that figure's two-dimensional
ellipsoid shapes now becoming cigar and football-shaped, as shown in Figure 4-2.
But for more than three variables, the visual metaphor of Cartesian spatial projection fails us, and multivariate factor analysis becomes necessary for clarity. Factor analysis attempts to simplify such complex systems of interrelationship into fewer, more easily
interpretable "axes" or "components," each representing a manageable and elucidating
distillation of some aspect of the original variables' interrelationship. The "first principal
component" is the axis that best resolves the overall interrelationship. Some information
must necessarily be lost in this simplification process, so the sign of a useful and
appropriately applied factor analysis, according to Gould, is that a high percentage of
original information remains recognizable within the simplified result. Computed from a
factored matrix of individual correlation coefficients, factor analysis to this day has been
important and widely used in a broad array of statistical applications. It was first
harnessed by Charles Spearman for application in intelligence testing theory.
How are multivariate correlation statistics relevant to intelligence testing?
Spearman observed that an individual's performance levels on tests of different,
specialized aspects of mental performance (e.g., numerical computation, logical
reasoning, spatial problem solving, memory skills, et al.) are often highly correlated.
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In other words, people who scored well on one type of test often scored well on other
types; those scoring poorly on one type often scored poorly on others. Gould contends
that Spearman invented factor analysis in 1904 essentially as a method of inferring the
existence of a unifying and quantifiable mental capacity that was responsible for these
frequently observed positive correlations in mental tests:
Since most correlation coefficients in the matrix are positive, factor analysis must
yield a reasonably strong first principal component. Spearman calculated such a
component indirectly in 1904 and then made the cardinal invalid inference that has
plagued factor analysis ever since. He reified it as an "entity" and tried to give it an
unambiguous causal interpretation. He called it g, or general intelligence and
imagined that he had identified a unitary quality underlying all cognitive mental
activity—a quality that could be expressed as a single number and used to rank
people on a unilinear scale of intellectual worth. (Mismeasure 251)
Rather than addressing the possibility that parallel performance in different skill areas
could be the result of more generalized motivational tendencies, diversified training,
opportunity, or environment, Spearman distilled all possible mental performance
contributors into one discrete internal factor, g.
To Gould, Spearman's g is indefensible for several reasons: First, the decision of
whether a causal physical meaning may be ascribed to a group of correlations with a
strong first principal component cannot be made based on numbers alone. In our
example of the strong positive correlation between arm length and leg length, only our
independent knowledge of the human physiological process of bone growth allowed us to
infer a cause for the parallel changes observed in these two variables. Without this
knowledge, arm length and leg length could conceivably have been attributed to two
entirely different causes.
Second, Gould believes that the factor analytical method used by Spearman to
calculate g is only moderately robust, resolving only 50 to 60 percent of original mental
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test information—too little to justify reification of all mental capacities into a single
entity (Mismeasure 251).
Third, the "first principal component" method is, according to Gould, only one of
several equally valid "vector-based" methods for defining axes (components) in multivariable relationships. For example, Spearman might just as well have chosen to
designate two or three different component axes representing simplified "skill clusters"
(such as Math and Verbal related skills); Gould suggests he avoided these alternatives
because only the first principal component method permitted the reification of g.
Gould sees in factor analysis a valid tool for simplifying complex interrelationships, but not one for the reification of abstractions or the assignment of causality:
The temptation to reify is powerful. The idea that we have detected something
"underlying" the external realities of a large set of correlation coefficients,
something perhaps more real than the superficial measurements themselves, can be
intoxicating. It is Plato's essence, the abstract, eternal reality underlying superficial
appearances. But it is a temptation that we must resist, for it reflects an ancient
prejudice of thought, not a truth of nature. (Mismeasure 252)
To Gould, factor analysis harnessed for reification is yet another example of Western
civilization's dangerously reductionistic predilections. Life and human thought are to
him very complex, wondrous, and multifarious processes, and our species' presumption
that these may be somehow distilled into quantifiable essences is more a testament to our
own cognitive limits and frailties than to our analytical prowess.
But the reification of g became essential to twentieth-century hereditarianism.
A testament to its importance, in Gould's view, was that it motivated Cyril Burt
Spearman's successor as psychology chair at London's University College from 1932
to 1950—to claim the title "originator of factor analysis" for himself despite strong
evidence of Spearman's just entitlement (Mismeasure 237). An ardent proponent of
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factor analysis and the presumed general intelligence factor, g, Burt injected into the
crucible what is to Gould the second major fallacy of intelligence testing—the idea that
IQ scores are primarily innate and unchangeable.
Burt held close to his heart the responsibility for disproving environmental
influence in intelligence development. In this 1909 quote from the British Journal of
Psychology, Burt cuts to the crux of twentieth-century biological determinism:
. . . the growing belief that innate characters of the family are more potent in
evolution than the acquired characters of the individual, the gradual apprehension
that unsupplemented humanitarianism and philanthropy may be suspending the
natural elimination of the unfit stocks these features of contemporary sociology
make the question whether ability is inherited one of the fundamental moment.
(qtd. in Gould, Mismeasure 275)
As can be predicted, Burt's anti-environmentalist advocacy became the rationale for
class / race-based sociopolitical advocacy. For what could be more welcome among
privileged classes than "scientific proof' that the sacrifice-obliging inclination to assist
those worse off than oneself was unfounded and even dangerous to society as a whole?
The advised inaction would be beneficial for society and pocketbook both—a veritable
slam dunk.
As support for his claim that intelligence is primarily inherited, Burt reported on
the most appropriate—and, to Burt's credit, perhaps the only appropriate

class of

experiment for any so-called test of "nature" vs. "nurture": studies of identical twins
raised apart. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Burt produced several reports supporting
the contention that the IQs of identical twins raised apart (in different environments)
showed very high correlation—thus disproving the contention that parental upbringing
and environment are significant influences on intelligence. In a 1966 article in the British
Journal of Psychology, Burt states that "the correlation of monozygotic twins reared in
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separate environments amounts to as much as 0.88," and even increases above this value
if the twins are reared together (Burt 151). Burt's study was impressive because it
seemed to encompass more pairs of twins than any previous study. It would also figure
strongly as a buttressing citation in Arthur Jensen's 1969 article, "How Much Can We
Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?"
Regarding the use of intelligence testing in primary and secondary education, it is
apparent that Burt epitomizes for Gould the very "brutal pessimism" that Alfred Binet
feared so much. In a 1959 journal article, Burt contended that low test performance
among the poor was an ineluctable consequence of inferior heredity:
Any recent attempt to base our educational policy for the future on the assumption
that there are no real differences, or at any rate no important differences, between
the average intelligence of the different social classes, is not only bound to fail; it is
likely to be fraught with disastrous consequences for the welfare of the nation as a
whole, and at the same time to result in needless disappointments for the pupils
concerned. The facts of genetic inequality, whether or not they conform to our
personal wishes and ideals, are something that we cannot escape. (qtd. in Gould,
Mismeasure 285)
Just as the intelligence testing movement in the United States became politically manifest
in the form of immigration restriction and forced-sterilization laws, in Britain the educational system was drastically reformed by the "Examination at 11+." From 1944 to the
mid 1960s, due in large part to the advocacy of hereditarian theorists like Burt, Britain
enacted this rigid IQ screening system in which the "lower-scoring 80 percent" of tenyear-old examinees were essentially diverted into "Trades" paths and way from future
university opportunities. Gould bemoans the countless talented youth subjected by this
system to the "pain of hopes dashed by biological proclamation" (Mismeasure 296).
Unfortunately for Burt's cause, however, by the 1970s most of his studies would be
discredited as fraudulent by the observations of then Princeton psychologist Leon Kamin
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and the investigative reporting of Oliver Gillie, medical correspondent for the London
Times. Among other statistical anomalies, Kamin noted with puzzlement that as the
number of twin pairs studied by Burt grew from about twenty to over fifty between 1955
and 1966, Burt claimed that average IQ correlation between twins remained unchanged
at "0.771"—a highly unlikely phenomenon statistically (Dorfman 1177). Gillie suggested that the reported roles for two of Burt's research assistants may have been falsified
(Gould Mismeasure 235). Similar statistical fabrications and methodological aberrations
surfaced in other Burt studies correlating IQ between parents and children and between
close relatives (Dorfman 1177).
Reacting to L. S. Hearnshaw's corroboratingly incriminating biography of Burt
(commissioned originally by Burt's sister), Gould writes that
the very enormity and bizarreness of Burt's fakery forces us to view it not as the
"rational" program of a devious person trying to salvage his hereditarian dogma
when he knew the game was up (my original suspicion, I confess), but as the
actions of sick and tortured man. (All this, of course, does not touch the deeper
issue of why such patently manufactured data went unchallenged for so long,
and what this will to believe implies about the basis of our hereditarian presuppositions). (Mismeasure 236)
To be caught perpetrating a bare-faced falsification of data is the ultimate incrimination
of a priori bias. Clutching for the almost deifying sanction that scientific proof would
have afforded his hereditarian ideas, Burt violated the basic tenets of scientific integrity.
To Gould, Burt's career exemplified the danger of shared dogma masquerading as
objectivity (Mismeasure 279). In Gould's depiction of Cyril Burt I am reminded of The
Importance of Being Earnest (1896), in which Oscar Wilde suggests that the loudest and
best articulated claims to honesty often originate from those with ulterior motives.
Appearance is all, sadly, for far too many people

deceivers and deceived alike.
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But even theories that are subsequently disproved do matter, in their time, for the
contingent theories and political consequences they engender. We have previously
discussed the perpetuation of Cyril Burt's error by Arthur Jensen, whose conclusion that
intelligence is 80 percent heritable was based on Burt's fraudulent data. The "chain of
misinformation" originating from Cyril Burt upsets Gould, from the Singapore Prime
Minister's desire to combat reproductive gains among his less intelligent citizens to the
persistence of Burt's discredited twin studies within introductory genetics textbooks as
late as 1984 (Gould, Bully 156).
Despite what Gould considers a continuing lack of supporting data, hereditarian IQ
theory is alive and well in the final decade of the twentieth century. Herrnstein and
Murray's The Bell Curve embodies all the key determinist tenets in its assumptions and
assertions that the reified g has been validated as a true and preeminent entity, that IQ
tests measure g well, and that group IQ differences reflect—and, in fact, justify

socio-

economic stratification within society.
Gould, Harvard psychologist Howard Gardner, Northeastern University psychologist Leon Kamin, and other scientists have found major flaws in The Bell Curve. To
Gould, the book's argument collapses if any one of the following four premises about
intelligence is false ("Ghosts" 16-17):
1) it is a single, discrete mental entity,
2) it is abstractable to a single, rankable number, "g,"
3) it is highly genetic in transmission, and
4) it is effectively immutable throughout the life of an individual.
Gould disputes the validity of all these premises.
Herrnstein and Murray state early on that the rankable "g" is a well respected
concept among intelligence scholars, and base their entire thesis on its validity. The
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problem from Gould's perspective is that "g" is in fact a contested issue among
intelligence researchers, and competing theories have garnered considerable support in
the field. As mentioned earlier, Gould contends that factor analysis—the statistical
method used to define "g" by simplifying performance data from diverse skill areas
into one variable

is flawed due to the inherently subjective assumptions made by its

developer, Charles Spearman, about the nature of intelligence (Gould, "Mismeasure By
Any" 8-9).
One "Non-g" theory emerges from Jean Piaget's Cognitive Psychology school.
Piaget focuses on the dynamic functional mechanisms of thought processes themselves,
and questions whether there is any palpable and measurable intellectual entity at all.
Another competing theory is that of Multiple Intelligences. Two variations of this theory
have been proposed, one by Howard Gardner and the other by Yale psychologist Robert
Sternberg (Neisser 79). Gardner argues that, in addition to the verbal, mathematical,
logical, and spatial capabilities tested by standard IQ tests, there also exist other
elemental abilities representative of social interpersonal, musical, and body-kinesthetic
aptitudes, among others. Sternberg proposes a tripartite intelligence composed of
Analytic (Academic), Creative, and Practical elements. While considering the case for
multivariate intellectual capacities, Sternberg explores differences between "book
knowledge" and the ability to solve real-life problems through "thinking on one's feet."
Sternberg writes:
Of course, a tester can always average over multiple scores. But are such averages
revealing, or do they camouflage more than they reveal? If a person is a wonderful
visualizer but can barely compose a sentence, and another person can write glowing
prose but cannot begin to visualize the simplest spatial images, what do you really
learn about these two people if they are reported to have the same IQ? (qtd. in
Herrnstein & Murray 16)
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Some of Sternberg's own tests of practical knowledge demonstrated better predictive
value of job performance than IQ tests (Carey 55).
As for intelligence being highly inheritable, Gould considers this to be the central
fallacy of the entire hereditarian theory ("Mismeasure By Any" 5). He admits, as all Bell
Curve critics do, that there truly does exist a 15 point (one standard deviation) difference
between the average IQ scores of Caucasian Americans and that of African Americans.
Gould will even grant that variation of intelligence within racial groups may very well be
significantly heritable, but he is adamant that we are unable to infer causative reasons for
IQ differences between racial groups.
Gould draws a compelling analogy in asking us to imagine a historically
undernourished South American tribe whose average height is 4 inches shorter than
the average North American Caucasian height. Within the tribe, there will be a variation
of tall, medium, and short people that is significantly hereditary (parents do tend to beget
offspring of similar stature to their own). However, Gould contends that, because the
nutritional and environmental effects are so widely different between the North American
and tribal cultures hypothesized, we cannot draw any inferences about whether genes
make North American Caucasians taller than the tribal group.
Other scientists have posed similar analogies, including an intriguingly more
complex scenario of giraffe height described by Harvard astrophysicist, David Layzer,
in his 1972 article, "Science or Superstition." Writing in opposition to Jensen and
Herrnstein publications of that time, Layzer argued that genetic factors and environmental factors are so dynamically interrelated that they cannot be considered statistically
independent contributors to IQ score (Layzer 662-663). He asks us to consider how
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giraffe height is determined not only by genetics, but also by local conditions influencing
food availability. True, the genetically taller giraffe may be able to reach more "upper
branches" in its search for food, but if that same giraffe were reared undernourished, it
might never have achieved its genetically determined height advantage.
Regarding The Bell Curve's strong assertion that intelligence is essentially
unchangeable throughout the life of the individual, critics have raised numerous counterexamples. For example, both sides of the debate acknowledge that worldwide average IQ
scores in all racial groups have been gradually rising since testing began in the early
twentieth century (Flynn, "Massive" and "Mean"; Herrnstein & Murray 307-309). The
difference, fifteen points over the past fifty years, is known as the "Flynn Effect." Since
World War II, some developing nations have demonstrated average IQ increases of
fifteen points, a change equal to the current gap between American Blacks and Whites
("Mismeasure By Any" 7). Hereditarians argue that, because these rises are universal,
they do not necessarily refute the existence of underlying group differences.
Notwithstanding Brigham's inference that immigrants in his time were less
intelligent than past immigrants, Brigham's own data begged the interpretation that
increasing exposure to American culture increased immigrant test scores. Yerkes's Army
study observation that Blacks from some northern states scored higher averages than
Whites from some southern states was reexamined by researcher Otto Klineberg in 1935.
Klineberg concluded that these higher northern Black IQ values were related to the length
of time they had spent taking advantage of better schools and living conditions in the
north (Frumkin 76). There has been evidence of strong IQ scores in poor Black children
adopted into affluent and intellectual homes ("Mismeasure By Any" 7).
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After controlling for IQ, blacks and Latinos have substantially
higher probabilities than whites of being in a high-IQ occupation

Figure 4-3. Probability of Being in a High-IQ Occupation. (Herrnstein and Murray 322)
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To Gould, the Bell Curve argument is also unsound from a statistical perspective.
Several critics observed that the book seems to capitalize on many lay people's inability
to distinguish "correlation" from "causation," portraying low IQ as the cause rather than
the effect of a wide array of social problems from poverty and crime to overpopulation.
Buried deep in the ample appendices of this eight-hundred page work are the details of
the correlation and regression analyses used by the authors to create numerous striking
graphs throughout the book. The graphs ostensibly demonstrate that IQ variation closely
correlates with variations in income, job prestige, work performance, income, criminal
tendencies, and social problems. The graphs also attempt to demonstrate that the degree
of correlation between family socioeconomic status and these same factors is often lower.
Causation aside, Gould finds these correlations alone to be much weaker than the
authors claim ("Mismeasure By Any" 11). He accuses the authors of allotting themselves
subjective "benefits of the doubt" in calculating "goodness-of-fit" relationships from
ambiguous or highly variable NLSY data. For example, Gould's compatriot Leon Kamin
calls attention to a Bell Curve graphic (see Figure 4-3) seeming to indicate that, with IQ
held constant, Blacks and Latinos have an unfair advantage in obtaining jobs requiring
high IQ levels. The chart first lists the probabilities of any White, any Black, and any
Latino (of the same age) obtaining a high-paying job that requires an IQ of 117. It then
lists the probabilities among candidates having an IQ of 117.
Kamin checked the math on the actual NLSY sample data. He determined that
the Black and Latino numbers were estimated from a very subjectively extrapolated
curve, and that the seemingly woefully unfair Black value of 26 percent represented only
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0.72 actual Black people

out of the entire population of 12,500 people studied (Kamin,

"Lies" 94). So much for unfair advantage.
The scholars cited heavily by Heiiiistein and Murray are strong proponents of
g-based intelligence as a reified, measurable structure. While the Multiple Intelligence
and Cognitive psychology theories of intelligence are introduced early on in The Bell
Curve, it is clear that the authors reject these alternative views while embracing those of a
cadre of race-concerned psychologists that has emerged since the 1960s. This cadre's
members have sometimes focussed so sharply on racial differences that it seems fair for
Gould to question the objectivity and intended purpose of their research.
For example, J.P. Rushton has devoted considerable energy to the resurrection of
nineteenth-century topics of scientific racism, including cranial capacity, brain weight,
and penis size differences between Blacks and Whites (Reed 267). Richard Lynn,
another cadre member, has edited the openly racist and pro-Nazi journal, Mankind
Quarterly, and receives funding from The Pioneer Fund, a nativist organization with a
eugenic orientation. According to Leon Kamin, he committed gross miscalculations,
distortions, and misrepresentations in a 1991 report which set the average African Black
IQ at 69 (Kamin, "Lies" 83-84). Arthur Jensen, as the group's elder statesman and
stalwart defender of "g," has done much to emphasize what he perceives to be the
undesirable consequences of lower Black IQ scores: higher levels of retardation, crime,
and social ills. He also has ties to the Pioneer Fund and to Mankind Quarterly.
In this chapter we have discussed Stephen Jay Gould's self-appointed role as
interpreter of evolutionary science's "cognitive filter"—the conditioning process or
"spin" that scientific knowledge (valid or invalid) undergoes prior to popular assimi-
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lation. After exploring manifestations of this filter specifically pertinent to Darwinian
evolutionary science, we examined the work of prominent biological determinist
scientists and authors for adherence to principles of "good science" and to scrutinize
the accuracy of their presentations to the general public.
As a highly skilled writer, Gould embeds within his essays not only a user-friendly
pedagogy of technical theory, but also a keen appreciation for (and wonderment at) the
surrounding context and consequences of scientific knowledge and of human existence
itself. Social consciousness and a respect for the humanities often permeate even Gould's
most technical material. Gould harbors sobering yet paradoxically uplifting convictions
about the role of humankind on this planet, in this universe, at this point in geological
time. In the next chapter, we will examine Gould's humanistic arguments against
biological determinism.

CHAPTER 5
WHO DO WE THINK WE ARE?

Far from denying his own liberal disposition, Gould avows it, believing that

in the

name of scientific honesty—scientists must acknowledge their own prejudices. Gould
grants freely that culture, socialization, upbringing, personal experience, intuitions, and
predispositions play a seminal role in the formation of his own (and any scientist's) world
view. It is the denial of one's own such prejudices (and the denial that they may be
transcended) that Gould considers potentially insidious.
Central to his own world view are the interpretations Gould draws about the
"status" or "role" of our species, Homo sapiens, within the larger picture of the universe's
"time-space continuum." Asserting that a chief danger of biological determinism lies in
its presumptions concerning human importance, morality, and ethics, Gould's essays
persistently confront these assumptions at multiple levels.

5.1

King of the Perspective Shift

The question "Who are we?" seems important to Gould, perhaps because he considers it a
question that science should not even pretend to answer. Gould considers entirely outside
the purview of science such "ultimate" questions as "What is the meaning / purpose of
life?" or "What, if any, are human responsibilities toward other humans and toward other
species of life?" To him, these questions are best deliberated within a separate domain of
authority or "magisterium" encompassing ethics, philosophy, and religion. Within this
realm the factual input generated by science must be respected, but scientists cannot be
charged with the responsibility for ethical decision-making. To Gould, intrinsic to
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biological determinism
support

and to the utilitarian sociopolitical ideology it helps to

is the transgression of science (or its interpreters) across this border into the

proper realm of ethics, philosophy, and religion. For example, recall how in National
Socialist Germany the perception of a scientifically validated "ladder of progress" toward
a higher race effectively abnegated ethical responsibility among the ruling elite.
It is seemingly to combat such encroachment of science into matters of ethics that
Gould's essays repeatedly reinforce his own stark view of Homo sapiens as a random
accident of nature

a product of geological and evolutionary contingency and happen-

stance that might just as randomly have left the dinosaurs dominating earth, or precluded
life's development here in the first place. Failing to understand or acknowledge what in
his view is the truly random nature of our own evolution, we have in many ways become
what he refers to as "earth's most arrogant species." The myopic overconfidence of
human despots and egotists seems tacitly to presume biological sanction and preordination for anything from interpersonal slights to genocide. But the recognition, for
example, that our species might not even exist were it not for the unscathed emergence
of Pikaia, the first-known chordate genus, from the Cambrian Explosion, can elicit a sort
of primeval humility immiscible with arrogance and inhumanity.
Gould agrees with Sigmund Freud's assertion that scientific revolutions necessitate
a re-ordering of our own view of ourselves

a shattering of the pedestals of human

arrogance. Freud cited the perspective shifts attendant with Copernicus's rejection of
terracentrism (which had hitherto declared the earth to be the center of the universe), with
Darwin's discovery that humans are descended from animals (not specially created), and
(immodestly) with the advent of his own theories on the nature of the human
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"subconscious." To this list Gould would add geology's discovery of the vastness of
time. Gould asserts that while heliocentrism and psychoanalytic theory were readily
welcomed as popular schemata, Darwinian evolution remains—even to this day

a

theory whose ramifications many educated humans are hesitant to acknowledge fully.
The reason? We find it difficult and deflating to accept our genealogical closeness to
monkeys.
Despite fossil evidence and other proof of the mechanisms of evolution, Gould
writes, "public perception of evolution has been so spin doctored that we have managed
to retain an interpretation of human importance scarcely different, in many crucial
respects, from the exalted state we occupied as the supposed products of direct creation in
God's image" (Dinosaur 326). Gould writes that it is still too painful for many of us to
acknowledge to ourselves that humans are truly not the crowning culmination of
unilinearly directed progress:
I like to summarize what I regard as the pedestal-smashing messages of
Darwin's revolution in the following statement, which might be chanted several
times a day, like a Hare Krishna mantra, to encourage penetration into the soul:
Humans are not the end result of predictable evolutionary progress, but rather a
fortuitous cosmic afterthought, a tiny little twig on the enormously arborescent
bush of life, which, if replanted from seed, would almost surely not grow this
twig again, or perhaps any twig with any property that we would care to call
consciousness. . . .
All the classic forms of evolutionary spin doctoring are designed to avoid the
radical and unwanted consequences of this mantra. (Dinosaur 327)
To Gould, evolution has not been a "path." It has been a fractal, chaotic, and unpredictable dynamic, the conception of which is both liberating and "pedestal smashing" for us.
It is liberating in an almost Zen-like way in that while it eschews the necessity to ascribe
any "meaning" or "direction" at all to the evolutionary process, it paradoxically can still
evoke a sense of wonder and dignity in the history and complexity of human existence.
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Table 5-1. Geological Time Scale for the Evolution of Life on Earth.
Compiled from Gould (Panda and Wonderful).

EVENT

DATE

COMMENTS

(YEARS x 106)

Earth's Origin

-4500

By our best geological estimate.

Earliest Life

-3500

Blue-green algal mats of simple, single-celled
prokaryotes. Five sixths of all life occurring
since has been single-celled.

First Eukaryotes

-1400

The first complex (nucleated) single-celled life.

-570

Origin of most complex multi-cellular animals.
Most major phyla of invertebrate animals appear
within a brief period of only a few million years.

-500

Fossil deposits prove that almost all radical
evolution of life forms occurred in the Cambrian
era, and that the magnitude of Cambrian change
has not been rivaled since.

225

Eliminated 50 percent of all marine invertebrate
families.

-70

Eliminated 25 percent of all animal families on
earth, including dinosaurs, which had dominated
for 100 million years. This permitted
mammalian ascendancy.

"Cambrian
Explosion"

Burgess Shale
Fossil Era

Permian
Extinction

Cretaceous
Extinction

Australopithecine
human ancestors

5

Homo sapiens
splits from most
recent ancestor

-0.27

Homo sapiens
spreads among
continents

-0.1

Homo sapiens a
dominant species
on earth

-0.05

Today
Sun to explode

0
+5000

Astronomers predict that the sun will explode in
approximately 5 billion years.
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In Gould's view, parallel to the average person's incomplete understanding of
Darwinian evolution is an analogous misapprehension of the breadth of geological time.
As a master of the pedagogical analogy, Gould presents this information in his essays
with jaw-dropping clarity. Table 5-1, "Geological Time Scale for the Evolution of Life,"
summarizes key geological and evolutionary events cited by Gould throughout his
popular essays. His key points are that:
1. Human existence composes an astonishingly small and recent proportion of the
4.5 billion years that have passed since the earth's astrophysical origin.
2. The overwhelming majority of all life forms that have ever existed on this
planet have been single-celled prokaryotic organisms such as bacteria and bluegreen algae. Prokaryotes lived alone on our planet for 3 billion years.
3. Few individual vertebrate species have survived longer than 10 million years;
extinction seems to be the common fate of all animals.
To convey the awe-inspiring sense of scale involved here, Gould employs two metaphors.
The first, called the "cosmic clock," compresses the earth's existence proportionally into
a single 24-hour period. Under this model, the final few seconds of that proportional day
represent all human existence, and the final few microseconds represent the contemporary span of our own lives. Another compelling analogy (though less mathematically
accurate) was coined by Mark Twain, who equated earth's age to the height of the Eiffel
Tower (300 meters) and man's existence on the planet to the thickness of the paint at its
pinnacle (Gould, Wonderful 45).
Despite his view of the vastness of nature, Gould does not perceive our cosmic
belittlement as dispiriting; he celebrates human uniqueness and power in having produced such a far-reaching impact on our world in our brief stay here. Gould stresses
scale, perspective, and the contingent randomness of evolution to remind us that, in his
view, "progress" is a mental construct fabricated without a realistic grasp of the true
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breadth of nature itself

and potentially dangerous to the extent that it is misused as a

call to action. "Humans are here by luck of the draw, not the inevitability of life's
direction or evolution's mechanism" (Full House 175).

5.2 The Most Arrogant Species
To Gould, the most insidious aspect of biological determinism lies in its complementarity
with flaws in the human psyche. Theorists and their ideas have meager impact unless
their ideas can percolate resonantly among the motivations and interests of lay people.
Unfortunately, it is often to our less ennobling human motivations that determinist
theories lend strongest support.
Gould decries the human proclivity for self delusion, especially as contained in our
frequent, hard-driving desire to crown our own groups as biologically superior to others.
Whether due to nature or nurture, the human mind can be quick to dichotomize others
into Us's and Them's relative to our family, our ethnic group, our football team, our
company, etc. We often seem to project alienating expectations upon others based on
their most superficial attributes, and then mistake their reflexive indignation for confirmation. To the extent that it motivates lay people to mentally segregate one another
based on race and class, Herrnstein and Murray's The Bell Curve might be said to reflect
and reinforce this common xenophobic trait in the human psyche.
As is evident to anyone who as a child (or adult) has been derided with an epithet
such as "stupid," names can act as incisive weapons. The very act of naming, categorization, or quantification—so critical to the reification precept of biological determinism
one of the strongest rhetorical weapons. Its attendant power of suggestion can be
destructive in itself Gould quotes the utilitarian philosopher, John Stuart Mill:

is
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The tendency has always been strong to believe that whatever received a name
must be an entity or being, having an independent existence of its own. And if no
real entity answering to the name could be found, men did not for that reason
suppose that none existed, but imagined that it was something peculiarly abstruse
and mysterious. (qtd. in Gould, Mismeasure 320)
Again, as rhetorician Kenneth Burke would no doubt agree, naming can communicate a
subtext of identity, power, and mystery that has proven highly effective in compelling
others toward the utterer's way of thinking. Through the power of suggestion, negative
branding can seriously impair individuals' and even groups' self esteem and drive-tosucceed

sometimes tragically fulfilling the label's initially incorrect classification.

Some Native American traditions, for example, attribute to naming a dignity-draining
capability that can demean and exert power over others. Successful athletes recognize
the utility of "psyching out" their opponents verbally before a contest. To Gould, the
classifying nomenclature of determinist theory offers a psychological moat, built around
a fortress inhabited by privileged classes, and intended to psych out those who would
attempt entry.
Our comforting and identity-building predilection for classifying each other into
cubbyholes can become ingrained within cherished (but erroneous) belief systems.
Gould suggests that time often exposes the foolishness of such cherished beliefs, and he
quotes as an example the British physician and biologist Charles White (from his 1799
treatise supporting a static and hierarchical "chain of being"):
Ascending the line of gradation, we come at last to the white European; who being
most removed from the brute creation, may on that account, be considered as the
most beautiful of the human race. No one will doubt his superiority of intellectual
powers; and I believe it will be found that his capacity is naturally superior also to
that of every other man. (qtd. in Gould, Flamingo 289)
White proceeds to describe European women as the "emblems of modesty, of delicate
feelings, and of sense," whose "plump and snowy white hemispheres, tipt in vermillion"
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set them above all other women (qtd. in Gould, Flamingo 290). Gould describes White
as blinded to his own culturally anchored bias, but also as a writer who was indeed
merely expressing and reinforcing common opinion within his own society.
To be fair, Gould has himself been accused (recall Frank Schmidt's opening
quotation) of pandering to common opinion among liberal egalitarian-oriented scientists
and lay people. Perhaps, since bias appears to be a multilateral phenomenon, more
credence should be given to the those whose perspective seems more aware of its own
prejudices, and more willing to transcend them where need be.
And who is not immune to the temptation of "believing what one wants to
believe"? Evolutionary theory refuted notions of a "static chain of being." But to Gould,
White's blindness to his own biases betrays a perennial blind spot to which all humans
are susceptible:
But how many of our own cherished beliefs, the ones that we never doubt because
we think that they map nature in an obvious way, will seem centuries hence just as
foolish and ideologically bound as the static chain of being? Should we not
examine the logic and verisimilitude of our own deepest convictions? (Flamingo
290)
To Gould, the danger is a complacent disinterest in obtaining and scrutinizing corroborating evidence: "No intellectual tyrannies can be more recalcitrant than the truths that
everybody knows and nearly no one can defend with any decent data (for who needs
proof of anything so obvious)" (Full House 212).
Status consciousness seems to play a strong role in garnering biological determinist
adherents. "It's not what you are that counts," Wall Street tycoon and political patriarch,
Joseph Kennedy, once said. "It's what people think you are" ("The Kennedy's"). This
captures an ethos that seems to pervade much of modern, competitive society from
schoolyards to board rooms to legislative houses. Perhaps it is in this "status
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consciousness" context that the sanctifying effect of biological determinism—of science
as deity—helps us so often to rationalize and condone as natural and inevitable those
socioeconomic inequalities we may perceive around us.
To Gould, the tragic consequence of such "natural and inevitable" logic is the
surrender of moral responsibility and autonomy to the monolithic abstraction called
"nature." With the facility of a literary scholar, Gould the Renaissance-Man polymath
conveys the tragedy of such moral abnegation in his essay, "The Monster's Human
Nature," an analysis of Mary Shelley's novel, Frankenstein (1818). Perhaps the most
egregiously misinterpreted masterpiece of English literature (due largely to its
bastardization by the Hollywood film industry), Shelley's Frankenstein strikes to the
heart of universal human morality and pathos. To Gould the novel is a keenly honed
depiction of the moral danger that the average person's continuing misapprehension of
"nature" and "nurture" can foster.
Readers of Shelley's book (as opposed to viewers of the 1931 film version with
Boris Karloff) are touched by this story of an unattractive creature thrust against his will
into a world unwilling to welcome him. Wanting, at first, nothing more than the chance
to live, earn his own sustenance, and contribute to the welfare of his newfound community, he is shunned and ultimately degraded to the point of violently indignant vengeance
against all that is human.
Gould sees in Shelley's creature a metaphor for human behavioral complexity:
"Shelley tells us that all humans reject and even loathe the monster for a visceral reason
of literal superficiality: his truly terrifying ugliness—a reason both heartrending in its
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deep injustice, and profound in its biological accuracy and philosophical insight about the
meaning of human nature" (Dinosaur 58).
The creature's appearance, it is true, evokes in others a natural revulsion. But it is
people's reaction to him—not his biological nature itself

that provokes his destructive

impulses. Gould acknowledges that our biological makeup does seem to include an
instinctual aversion to seriously malformed humans. However, he argues that human
consciousness has progressed

through training, understanding, and nurture—to the

point where the importance of treating the unattractive with civility and compassion is
clearly manifest. Gould views Victor Frankenstein, the creature's creator, as morally
derelict both for failing to empathize with the creature and for neglecting to educate
others that the creature was a dignified being worthy of community acceptance.
To Gould, we seriously oversimplify when we attempt to attribute human
behavioral traits exclusively to either "Nature" or "Nurture," or to discretely quantifiable proportions of the two. To him, human behavioral traits develop as the result of a
complex and unquantifiable dynamic involving both biology and environment: "Nature
supplies general ordering rules and predispositions, but nurture shapes specific manifestations over a wide range of potential outcomes" (Dinosaur 60). Inherent in parental
"nurture," for Gould, is the moral responsibility to foster the dignity, integrity, and
acceptance of all new life.
In reading Gould's analysis of Frankenstein, one cannot help but analogize the
biological determinist's ostracism of unfavored races and classes to the ostracism of
Shelley's creature. How unlikely is it that an honest, sincere, and benevolent member of
an unfavored race, in the presence of an unwelcoming and suspicious majority, could
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grow indignant and destructive toward that majority? Perhaps we sometimes mistake
the repercussions of our "Us / Them" polarizations as justifications for them. In Gould's
words, "the monster's misery arose from the moral failure of other humans, not from his
own inherent and unchangeable constitution" (Dinosaur 62).

5.3 The Gouldian Rule
Morality is intimately entwined with our perception of nature. Consider how many moral
/ ethical disputes employ the argument "It's only natural" as a moral justification, for
example. The views of sociobiology theorist Edward 0. Wilson and Stephen Jay Gould
strike an interesting contrast on the relationship between ethics and science.
To Wilson, ethical principles such as justice and human rights are not abstract
goals independent of human physical experience; they are human neurological functions
enabled by our biology (Wilson, "Biological Basis"). Moral behavior issues, in his view,
have a purely material, naturally selected origin within human evolution itself, and may
therefore be studied empirically through science. He describes traditional Western
theological and secular philosophical perspectives on ethics as "transcendental" for their
common belief in some form of overarching natural law independent of human physical
biology and experience. Of his preferred empiricism, and its conflict with
transcendentalism, Wilson writes:
[My] empiricist argument holds that if we explore the biological roots of moral
behavior, and explain their material origins and biases, we should be able to fashion
a wise and enduring ethical consensus. . . .
The choice between transcendentalism and empiricism will be the coming
century's version of the struggle for men's souls. Moral reasoning will either
remain centered in idioms of theology and philosophy, where it is now, or shift
toward science-based material analysis. Where it settles will depend on which
world view is proved correct, or at least which is more widely perceived to be
correct. ("Biological Basis")
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It is interesting that Wilson sees the greatest split not between religious and secular
interests—both of which he considers predominantly transcendentalist—but between
transcendentalists and empiricists such as himself, who see a biological basis for
morality.
Gould, on the other hand, is adamant that science is not equipped to supply answers
to moral and ethical questions. Science's only ethical roles, in his view, are to refute
misapplied facts and to be vigilant for its own abuse. To him, morality and ethics must
be applied from our transcending sense of humanity and social consciousness—not
linked to any prerequisite science-based knowledge:
As a scientist, I can refute the stated genetic rationale for Nazi evil and nonsense.
But when I stand against Nazi policy, I must do so as everyman as a human
being. For I win my right to engage moral issues by my membership in Homo
sapiens a right vested in absolutely every human being who has ever graced this
earth, and a responsibility for all who are able. (Dinosaur 318)
While Burt, Jensen, Hermstein, and Murray seem to circumscribe moral righteousness,
societal efficiency, and civic virtue as responsibilities best assumed by a presumed
intellectual elite, Gould adopts a more egalitarian distribution of moral empowerment.
To Gould, moral duty is a universal right and obligation, not an earned privilege.
Although Gould avoids overt endorsement of a specific ethical philosophy, to me
the conflict between biological determinism and its opponents is embedded within the
larger conflict existing between teleological and deontological schools of ethics. A brief
description of these opposing ethical philosophies is therefore in order.
Teleological philosophy defines activities as Right or Wrong based on their ability
to elicit a desired end. The most commonly designated "desired end" is personal happiness. Utilitarianism, the dominant teleological theory (and the dominant philosophy
undergirding Capitalist economic systems), defines as Right any action or policy that
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creates maximum happiness for a maximal number of people. Its chief proponents
include the nineteenth-century philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
By this philosophy, if an action enhances the well-being of the majority—albeit to the
dissatisfaction or even detriment of a minority—that action is Right because "net societal
satisfaction" has been increased.
Deontological ethics, on the other hand, defines Rightness based on the nature of
the act itself, not on any abstractly weighted computation of net good or harm for society
members. Dictated by an act's intrinsic moral character

and existing apart from any

need to produce a desired end—Right transcends the needs and preferences of human
individuals. As a proponent of deontological "formalism," the eighteenth-century
philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that "happiness" and "pleasure" were motives too
base to employ as the foundation for a system of ethics. Instead, he proposed the
"categorical imperative," an absolute and reason-based moral principle that prescribes
how people should act regardless of desired ends. The contemporary deontological
philosopher, John Rawls, propounds "contractarianism," an ethical system concerned
with defining the optimal social rules for constructing a fair society.
Rawls proposes a hypothetical set of laws called the "original position,"
representing the outcome of a rationally argued debate among a founding congress of
equal citizens. To prevent the enactment of laws favoring some citizens over others,
Rawls proposes a restraint called the "Veil of Ignorance," under which the members of
this founding congress do not know what their own social status will be once the law is
enacted. An obvious consequence of this lack of information would be the enactment of
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more truly equitable laws

a truly "blind" justice. To protect one's own best interest

under the Veil, one must protect all others' best interests as well.
The ethical empiricist, Edward 0. Wilson, rejects Rawls's "Justice as Fairness"
system as having wholly ignored human biological reality:
While few will disagree that justice as fairness is an ideal state for disembodied
spirits, the conception is in no way explanatory or predictive with reference to
human beings. Consequently, it does not consider the ultimate ecological or
genetic consequences of the rigorous prosecution of its conclusions. (Sociobiology
642)
Concerned about the more socialistic political implications of Rawls's philosophy,
Wilson opposes what he sees as the tightening of social control and lowering of personal
initiative that true fairness would require ("Biological Basis").
Western utilitarian philosophy's emphasis on "ends" is complemented by
biological determinism's emphasis on directed, unilateral progress and rankability of
human worth (and the hallowed niche it reserves for the biologically superior). The task
of computing the net benefit of a given set of ends to society

often necessarily a highly

subjective process— is much facilitated by the reductionistic reification and quantification techniques employed so skillfully by determinists. For example, we have seen
how skull and brain measurements and IQ testing have been employed with the intent of
providing easily interpretable gauges of different groups' societal contributions.
Just as Kant's Categorical Imperative and Rawls's Veil of Ignorance shift focus
away from desired ends, Stephen Jay Gould's frequent reminders about the "random,
contingent accident" of human evolution derail the determinist view of a directed, linear
progress culminating in the ends of human 'higher races" and intellectual elites. Gould's
emphasis on the contingent happenstance of human evolution shifts the scientific focus
from determinism's a priori, conclusions about human biological preeminence to a
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perspective from which human desires and ends are removed from center stage, with
nature providing no sanction for any human social structure.
To Gould this "amorality of nature" disqualifies science as a potential source of
moral / ethical validation, but (almost paradoxically) elevates each individual's sense of
humanity to the fore as the rightful agent of moral action. Gould quotes Vernon Kellogg,
an early twentieth-century entomologist and teacher of evolution: "Some men who call
themselves pessimists because they cannot read good into the operations of nature forget
that they cannot read evil. In morals the law of competition no more justifies personal,
official, or national selfishness or brutality than the law of gravitation justifies the
shooting of a bird" (Bully 430). As reflected in his treatment of Shelley's Frankenstein,
the root of moral responsibility lay for Gould not in nature, but in our reaction to it.
Gould refrains from espousing a specific ethical philosophy, perhaps for the same
reason that practitioners of Zen Buddhism reject rationality, logic, and "good / bad"
dualism: the recognition that the more reliant understanding becomes upon symbolism
and interpretation, the less universally recognizable and useful that understanding
becomes. There is for Gould, though, one ethical principle that does approach such
universality—the perennial "Golden Rule" of treating others as one would prefer to be
treated. On ethical philosophy, Gould writes:
Many proposals embody the abstract majesty of a Kantian categorical imperative.
Yet I think that we need something far more grubby and practical. We need a
version of the most useful and ancient moral principle of all—the precept
developed in one form or another by nearly every culture because it acts, in its
legitimate appeal to self-interest, as a doctrine of stability based upon mutual
respect. No one has ever improved upon the Golden rule. (Bully 18)

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

How do we most accurately characterize Stephen Jay Gould's enduring role as devil's
advocate to popular evolutionary science? In this chapter we will explore this question
through the eyes of some of his critics, through the examination of some unlikely
recipients of Gould's praise and criticism and through the deeper exploration of Gould's
crux argument against biological determinism—biological potentialism.

6.1 The Loyal Opposition
As is evident in the two quotations that began this thesis, Gould is not without his
detractors. If Gould paints the determinists correctly and if the practice and popular
dissemination of science is as culturally interlaced as he contends, such criticism
is not at all surprising. While Gould admits that determinist movements have enlisted
both conservative and liberal allegiances for different issues and historical contexts, it
seems safe to claim that the majority of Gould's most vituperative critics are opposed to
his essentially liberal ideology. To Gould, determinism is a sanctifying, rationalizing
ideology—a conservative and homeostatic mechanism whose criticism not surprisingly
cuts to the heart of those who would be most threatened by social change.
Recall (professor of Human Resources) Frank Schmidt's reference on page 1 of
this thesis to Gould's Mismeasure of Man as "merely a Marxist polemic." The word
"Marxist" in prospering 1990s America is commonly applied (as it seems to have been in
this case) in smugly pejorative fashion by well-situated conservatives against liberals that
question the fairness of Western capitalistic social systems. Along with another highly
effective rhetorical term, "politically correct," the name "Marxist" achieves a strong
106
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magnitude on the rhetorical "Richter Scale." Schmidt, a professor of Human Resources
at the University of Iowa, is cited in The Bell Curve for his statistical meta-studies of IQ's
relationship to job performance. Because Gould and his anti-determinist colleagues have
not disputed that aptitude testing can be an important predictor of job-specific aptitude,
the sharp tone of Schmidt's critique suggests Gould has struck a sociopolitical nerve far
deeper than the mere details of aptitude testing. Gould's frequent contention that the
societal status quo is as much a function of human choices as of human biological
capabilities is understandably abhorrent to many people (perhaps including Professor
Schmidt) who occupy respected positions in Western society.
In keeping with his contention that scientists must openly acknowledge their own
ideologically formative cultural biases, Gould openly avows his own "liberal" mindset.
He does so within the bounds of the previously discussed "context of discovery," with
full knowledge that his ultimate scientific credibility (as demonstrated in his "context of
justification") must eschew personal and political bias for generally accepted rigor. In a
review of a work by fellow anti-hereditarians R. C. Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon
Kamin, Gould admits a strong empathy for these words by the authors:
We share a commitment to the prospect of the creation of a more socially just
—a socialist—society. And we recognize that a critical science is an integral
part of the struggle to create that society, just as we also believe that the social
function of much of today's science is to hinder the creation of that society by
acting to preserve the interests of the dominant class, gender, and race. (qtd. in
Urchin 149)
But the word "Marxist" is a loaded one for Gould. So obviously suggested as a
rhetorical jab at his credibility, the label is not one that Gould considers accurate for
himself. In 1995, when pressed pointedly on this subject by Scientific American
interviewer, John Horgan, Gould admitted that some of Marx's ideas were compatible

108
with his own--for example the idea that social change occurs not gradually but in a
"punctuational mode, in which you accumulate small insults to the system until the
system itself breaks."
In keeping with his emphasis on evolutionary randomness and contingency,
however, Gould rejects Marx's preoccupation with historical predestination and determinism. In the same Horgan interview, Gould states that, like many scientists, he is
averse to being associated with "isms," especially ones which, like Marxism, have
become widely overextended, misinterpreted, and misapplied throughout history. For
this same reason, late in life, Marx proclaimed himself "not a Marxist." Regardless of
Horgan's apparent intent to force Gould into a rhetorically shaming admission, I believe
Gould would have had no qualms about admitting Marxist allegiance if it were it true.
Gould does praise the socialist philosopher Friedrich Engels, however, no doubt
fueling the ire of conservative Human Resource scholars like Schmidt. For Gould,
Engels's writing provides insights into the reason that cerebral primacy became so
important to biological determinists. Inspired by Darwinian evolutionary theories, Engels
hypothesized that the division of labor developed early on in human cultures as the result
of small groups of men seizing power and forcing others to work for them. Engels's
theory of "Head and Hand" propounded that this division of labor engendered the
Western class system that has survived ever since

a class system that, in Gould's words,

encouraged an emphasis on thought as primary, dominating, and altogether more
noble and important than the labor it supervised. . . . Cerebral primacy seemed so
obvious and natural that it was accepted as a given, rather than recognized as a
deep-seated social prejudice related to the class position of professional thinkers
and their patrons. (Ever Since 212)
This is apparently not what Frank Schmidt, promoter of intelligence testing as a predictor .
of job performance, wants to hear. In his scathing review of the 1996 re-issue of The
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Mismeasure of Man, Schmidt admits that nineteenth-century efforts such as Morton's
skull measurement and Lombroso's criminal anthropology were flawed, but claims that
contemporary intelligence testing is based on unassailable data entirely unrelated to such
flawed physical measurements. Aside from alluding to the existence of like-mindedly
negative reviews of Mismeasure by scholars such as Arthur Jensen and J. P. Rushton,
however, Schmidt cites no specific studies or data.
Tom Bethel, a media fellow at the conservative Hoover Institution, contributed the
introductory chapter's second anti-Gould quotation, arguing that Gould is wrong to infer
human racial equality from evolutionary history because "if anything, evolution predicts
differentiation." Contrary to the common conservative assumption that Gould acknowledges no differences between people, Gould actually concurs that there are vast differences in aptitudes among individuals of all races, and that these differences can confer
adaptive advantages to the individuals possessing them. What Gould argues vehemently
against, however, is the idea that significant inherent differences exist between average
group traits. "Our races may vary little in average characters, but our individuals differ
greatly," Gould writes in The Flamingo's Smile (197). To date, neither paleontological
nor molecular biological proof of significant structural or functional differences between
races has been demonstrated.
For his attempts to exclude natural selection and adaptationism from the sociobehavioral domain, Gould has been criticized for building his own personal "picket
fence" around Darwinism. For example, philosophy scholar David Dennett chides Gould
for his interpretation of Darwin, calling it just another in a "series of failed attempts in the
struggle [within the community of evolutionary biologists] to contain Darwin's idea

110
within some acceptably 'safe' and merely partial revolution" (qtd. in Clayton). Like
sociobiology founder Edward 0. Wilson and the British evolutionary biologist, Richard
Dawkins, Dennett favors the belief that human morality, cognition, language, and culture
may be the result of direct Darwinian adaptation. This opposes Gould's view, which is
that these traits are secondary side-attributes of an advanced brain that evolved to provide
other, more primary adaptive benefits (such as improved hunting skill, or group

cooperation).
In a semantical jab at liberal Darwinian interpretations such as Gould's,
Swarthmore historian Robert Bannister contends that in its time the term "social
Darwinism" itself was more of a rhetorical epithet—applied by liberals against anyone
who disagreed with them—than an accurate designation of prevailing upper-class
sentiment:
So, by the 1880s, the phrases "struggle for existence" and "natural selection,"
as applied to society, were catchwords used by those who opposed unrestricted
competition and the cult of individual success against those who allegedly espoused
these values. For this reason defenders of free enterprise or individual initiative
invoked them at their peril.. . . It is hoped that scholars, and particularly the nonhistorians who continue to recite the conventional story, may at least be made
aware of the historical distortion involved. (Bannister)
Bannister believes social Darwinism was a myth employed then and now for rhetorical
purposes by liberal ideologues. A highly skilled rhetorician, Bannister attempts to plant
doubts about whether socioeconomic injustice even existed at all during the "Industrial
Golden Age." I think back to my experience with a company president who spoke of his
hiring process sarcastically as "renting more arms and legs." I am also reminded of
contemporary neo-Nazi leaders who claim that the Holocaust never happened, and of
George Orwell's 1984 (1949), wherein citizens are brainwashed with the mantra that
today's [new] enemy is the same as yesterday's and tomorrow's.
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Gould's critics—and Gould himself

are true not only to their individual

disciplines, but also to their own sociocultural milieux. Their "Contexts of Discovery"
and (in the case of political commentators like Tom Bethel) their "Contexts of Criticism"
ineluctably frame their outlooks. Since individuals often seem to confuse their own
cultural contexts for natural inevitabilities, perhaps one of Gould's greatest contributions
has been to demonstrate through his writing the inextricability of social, economic,
political, and cultural influences from the work of those who proclaim objectivity and
impartiality.

6.2 The Well-Tempered Dissenter
I like to apply a somewhat cynical rule of thumb in judging arguments about
nature that also have overt social implications: When such claims imbue nature
with just those properties that make us feel good or fuel our prejudices, be doubly
suspicious. I am especially wary of arguments that find kindness, mutuality,
synergism, harmony the very elements that we strive mightily, and so often
unsuccessfully, to put into our own lives intrinsically in nature.
Stephen Jay Gould (Bully 339)

Gould's ability to confront nuance and ambiguity, shunning oversimplification, accents
his appeal. Wary of people and ideas that encourage pigeonholing humans into convenient classifications, Gould "takes his own medicine" and is not averse to acknowledging his points of agreement with rhetorical adversaries. Like the rare storekeeper
who, when out-of-stock on our desired item, directs us to his competitor, Gould avoids
low level rhetorical ploys—and in doing so bolsters his own credibility. For Gould, truth
lies between the extremes:
No simple equation can be made between social preference and biological
commitment. We can tell no cardboard tale of hereditarian baddies relegating
whole races, classes, and sexes to permanent biological inferiority—or of
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environmentalist goodies extolling the irreducible worth of all humans beings.
(Mismeasure 306-307)
Gould describes biological determinism as insidious only if harnessed to aid a theory of
differential worth and ranking—as it has been in the examples discussed in this thesis.
He does not deny that heredity—along with environment—is a significant contributor to
individual human mental capacities (though he will no doubt argue about the definition of
intelligence). Gould is most skeptical of factor analysis, of the physical measurement of
biological parameters for ranking, and of the simplistic reification he believes they imply.
Though some detractors try to paint him as such, Gould is clearly not a "New Age
airhead liberal dreamer." From his outspoken anti-creationist views (not discussed here)
one might at first conclude that Gould was ardently anti-religious. But this is not so.
Having established himself as one of the few evolutionary biologists promoting a peaceful and complementary coexistence between religion and science, Gould mounts his
counter-crusade against irrationalism and "unthinking romanticism" instead.
Author Jeremy Rifkin's 1984 book, Algeny (written with collaboration from
Nicanor Perlas), exemplifies Gould's concept of unthinking romanticism. The book's
title, Algeny (a play on the word "alchemy"), reflects Rifkin's skepticism of biotechnology. A perennial critic of biotechnology and genetic engineering, Rifkin used his
book to paint biotechnology as a potentially dangerous despoiler of a biological lineages
best left sacrosanct. To Gould, "Algeny touts itself as the manifesto of a movement to
save nature and simple decency from the hands of impatient and rapacious science"
(Urchin 230).
Superficially, Rifkin seems to share Gould's perspective by painting science in
general and biotechnology in particular as products of socially embedded motives.
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However, to Gould, Rifkin takes this off the deep end, ignoring those noble aspects of
science that are objective and that do have redeeming societal value:
. . . But in Rifkin's hands, this theme becomes a caricature. Rifkin ignores
the complex interplay of social bias with facts of nature and promotes a crude
socioeconomic determinism that views our historical succession of biological
world-views--from creationism to Darwinism to the new paradigm now supposedly under construction—as so many simple reflections of social ideology.
(Urchin 230-231)
Gould decries Rifkin's contention that Darwinism itself is unsupported by evidence and
was simply a product fabricated to undergird industrial capitalism ideologically. Gould's
review of Algeny was highly critical of Rifkin's low opinion of science: "If Rifkin's
argument embodies any antithesis, it is not left versus right, but romanticism, in its most
dangerous anti-intellectual form, versus respect for knowledge and its humane employment. . . . Few campaigns are more dangerous than emotional calls for proscription rather
than thought" (Urchin 238). Gould analogizes Rifkin's suggested restrictions on biotechnology with the banning of printing presses for their ability to print Mein Kampf as
readily as Hamlet.
Gould does not hesitate to laud what he sees as the positive attributes of those with
whom he otherwise disagrees. Although an ardent creationist who believed that God had
a direct and immediate hand not only in life's creation but in its revelation to himself, the
eighteenth-century Swedish scientist Carolus Linnaeus is nonetheless well admired by
Gould for introducing the Systema Naturae—the genealogy-based classification system
employing "genus" and "species"—which thrives to this day. Before Linnaeus, organisms were cataloged according to human-centered and artificial criteria such as
alphabetical order and "practical importance to humans." Linnaeus's Systema Naturae
instituted a robust, non-anthropocentric system based on genealogical similarity. To
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Gould it heralded the critical "First Unmasking of Nature," the first pedestal-smashing
blow to objectivity-hindering human arrogance. Darwin's evolution, in its nonanthropocentric explanation of how different organisms arose, would become the
"Second Unmasking" that would ultimately refute creationism.
Even the bible-toting lawyer and politician, William Jennings Bryan, perhaps the
early twentieth century's staunchest legal advocate of creationism, earned Gould's
respect for Bryan's like-minded sense that Darwinism was being harnessed for purposes
of political and social subjugation. Although Gould deplores Bryan's creationism (as
advocated, for example, in the Scopes trial of 1925) for its irrational refusal to accept
well-demonstrated facts of geological time and Darwinian animal genealogy, he empathizes with Bryan's sincere concern for human dignity. In his 1904 book, The Prince of
Peace, Bryan wrote:
The Darwinian theory represents man as reaching his present perfection by the
operation of the law of hate—the merciless law by which the strong crowd out and
kill off the weak. If this is the law of our development then, if there is any logic
that can bind the human mind, we shall turn backward toward the beast in proportion as we substitute the law of love. I prefer to believe that love rather than hatred
is the law of development. (qtd. in Gould, Rocks 154-155)
Bryan had been angered by published reports from the American evolutionary scientist
Vernon Kellogg and British commentator Benjamin Kidd about "German military ethos"
during World War I. These authors documented from first-hand experience that German
violence and cruelties during World War I had been fueled by German intellectuals'
inferences of competitive struggle, racial superiority, and "might makes right" aggression
from Darwinist theory (Bully 424-425).
Gould admired Bryan's pacifism as well as his appeals for women's suffrage,
the graduated income tax, child labor protections, and Philippine independence from
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American imperialism. Gould writes, "Lord only knows, he understood precious little
about science, and he wins no medals for logic of argument. But when he said that
Darwinism had been widely portrayed as a defense if war, domination, and domestic
exploitation, he was right" (Rocks 163).

6.3 Humility and the Case for Biological Potentialism
I hope [the ultimate effect of my work] will be one further step in the kind of
humility that would benefit humans enormously with regard to our powers and
possibilities on this planet. I think we want to be around for a while. We'd better
understand that we weren't meant to be, and we don't have dominion over everything, and we're not always as smart as we think.
Stephen Jay Gould (qtd. in Krasny)
Above all, Gould's writing implores a healthy skepticism about the nature of popularly
disseminated scientific truth. It begs acknowledgment that scientists and their interpreters are not immune to social, economic, and moral biases. "Much of what we regard
as empirically proven, or logically necessary, may only be a contingent reflection of
transient social preferences," Gould asserts (Dinosaur 135).
To Gould, scientists justly inspire a unique trust for their inductive and analytical
achievements, but this trust is easily betrayed: "Many people believe that evolution
validates this or that moral behavior because scientists have told them so. When we view
the behavior thereby justified as either benign or harmless, we tend to look the other way,
and give the scientist a pass for his hubris" (Rocks 164). Gould believes that lay people
in this way often relinquish their own sense of moral responsibility to science.
A common trait of membership in any culture is an inability to distinguish the
"universal" or "natural" from that which is culturally determined. As a historian of
science, Gould has spent his entire literary career demonstrating for the intelligent
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layperson the undeniable social power and bias potential inherent in our perceptions of
this Culture vs. Nature dichotomy. "Indian skull sizes support Manifest Destiny." "Jews
are naturally inferior to Aryans and must be eradicated in the name of Nature." "Lower
Black IQ scores prove racial inferiority and justify segregation." Wherever one group
dominates another, the urge to rationalize and sanctify the status quo with "objective"
science seems common.
Until scrutinized, bias

like culture—is often unperceived by its host. In Gould's

words, "Some of [our biases] are so venerable, so reflexive, so much a part of our second
nature that we never stop to recognize their status as social decisions with radical alternatives

and we view them instead as given and obvious truth" (Full House 8). Gould asks

us to think about how we think and about how our culture has molded what we think.
Gould won't allow the rhetoric of biological determinist science

with its "mysterious"

and secularly sanctifying aspect—to pass undetected as rhetoric or to circumvent our
right to reasoned, reflective thought.
The "perspective shift"—Gould's unique talent for clearly and interestingly
communicating the vastness of geological time and the contingent nature of human
evolution—is a chief constituent of Gould's "anti-rhetoric vaccine." He deploys it
repeatedly against what he sees as progress-driven utilitarian social ideologies and their
attendant corollaries of unilinear ranking, evolution to elite human subgroups, and
justified racial discrimination. With his perspective shifts Gould attempts to salvage a
dignifying humility from the destructive arrogance fostered by notions of master species
and master races. I write "dignifying humility" because I see in Gould's abandonment
of anthropocentrism something akin to the Zen Buddhist concept of non-duality—the
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spiritually enriching abandonment of logical (but often misleading) intellectual dichotomies such as "good vs. bad" and "progressive vs. regressive." Far from viewing the
"human accident" with dismay, Gould states that "I have always regarded it as exhilarating and a source of both freedom and consequent moral responsibility" (Wonderful
291).
To Gould the greatest danger of biological determinism is that it is a "theory of
limits." As such, it ascribes the "controlling share" in all important formative aspects of
individual achievement not to childhood environmental context or learning opportunities,
but to heredity, which by definition is beyond the control of the individual. The societal
implications of this disempowerment of the individual are weighty: Gould believes that
under this determinist view whole ethnic groups can be weighted down with low expectations, insufficient economic resources, and the general distrust of communal attempts to
assist them. The critical performance determinants of individual self-confidence and
perseverance

often profoundly subservient to the power of suggestion—wither away.

Perhaps most tragically, as in Shelley's Frankenstein, repercussions of society's "Us /
Them" polarizations may be perceived as justifications for them.
As an empowering alternative, Gould's espoused biological potentialism acknowledges an undeniably important role for heredity as the substrate for individual human
achievement, but embraces environmental influence as a controlling catalyst in that
achievement's denouement. Gould readily admits that heredity often does impose upon
individuals either debilitating limits or the potential for truly exceptional talents. But in
his view the impact of one's physical debilities

and the fruition or frustration of one's

innate potential talents—are a function of environmental influence, not heredity. In a

,
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related comment on the determinist predilection for ranking physical measurements,
Gould writes that "I am, somehow, less interested in the weight and convolutions of
Einstein's brain than in the near certainty that people of equal talent have lived and died
in cotton fields and sweatshops" (Panda 151).
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